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1� years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the bilateral relationship be-
tween the United States and Russia is still one of the most important in world 
politics. Despite this, the US-Russia relationship seems to be described more 
often than not in terms of crisis and conflict. Russia has obviously contrib-
uted to this development, and the many deficiencies of contemporary Russian 
politics have been described amply before. This study takes a closer look at the 
American side of the relationship, and at the implications of US foreign policy 
on bilateral relations with Russia. The main argument is that US Russia policy 
has had a negative influence. Although the relationship seemed to be moving in 
a positive direction after the events of 9/11, several US actions, both in terms of 
its general foreign policy and its Russia policy, have undermined future positive 
developments and cut the relationship short of its considerable potential. The 
war on terror, which provided the initial impetus for closer US-Russia coopera-
tion, ultimately highlighted disagreement and conflicting interests rather than 
facilitating further rapprochement. Many of these developments and the core is-
sues of the bilateral relationship were often rooted in “hard security” issues. The 
Russian focus on this and their preoccupation with traditional security policy 
made cooperation resemble a zero-sum game, and it also diminished the level of 
trust in US-Russia relations, making cooperation in general more difficult. 
INSTITUTT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
ISSN 15�4-���53 © Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
info@ifs.mil.no – www.ifs.mil.no
THOMAS DEVOLD
Devold holds a Cand. Polit. degree in political science from the University of 
Oslo. From ����� to ����, Devold was a Research Fellow at the Institute for De-             
fence Studies. The study was written during his stay at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies in Washington DC.
SUMMARy
1� years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the bilateral relationship be-
tween the United States and Russia is still one of the most important in world 
politics. Despite this, the US-Russia relationship seems to be described more 
often than not in terms of crisis and conflict. Russia has obviously contrib-
uted to this development, and the many deficiencies of contemporary Russian 
politics have been described amply before. This study takes a closer look at the 
American side of the relationship, and at the implications of US foreign policy 
on bilateral relations with Russia. The main argument is that US Russia policy 
has had a negative influence. Although the relationship seemed to be moving in 
a positive direction after the events of 9/11, several US actions, both in terms of 
its general foreign policy and its Russia policy, have undermined future positive 
developments and cut the relationship short of its considerable potential. The 
war on terror, which provided the initial impetus for closer US-Russia coopera-
tion, ultimately highlighted disagreement and conflicting interests rather than 
facilitating further rapprochement. Many of these developments and the core is-
sues of the bilateral relationship were often rooted in “hard security” issues. The 
Russian focus on this and their preoccupation with traditional security policy 
made cooperation resemble a zero-sum game, and it also diminished the level of 
trust in US-Russia relations, making cooperation in general more difficult. 
CONTENTS
Introduction    7
STRUCTURE      9
Perspectives on US foreign policy  13
GENERAL PERSPECTIVES ON US FOREIGN POLICy  13
PERSPECTIVES ON US POLICIES TOWARD RUSSIA   17
CONTExTUAL FACTORS      22
US Russia Policy 2001–2006    23
POLICIES UNDER PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS  23
FOREIGN POLICy PREPARATIONS AND AGENDA   25
US RUSSIA POLICy BEFORE 9/11     28
US RUSSIA POLICy AFTER 9/11     38
ENERGy COOPERATION – ENTRENCHING THE RELATIONSHIP? 58
PREVALENT POLICy APPROACHES AND SUMMARy OF FINDINGS 69
Russian perceptions of US policy   72
RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS    72
SPECIFIC RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE PERIOD 2001–2006  76
PARTNERSHIP AND RECIPROCITy    78
Analysis and conclusion     82
MAIN FINDINGS    82
DOMINANT APPROACHES   85
THE WILSONIAN DILEMMA   86
DEVELOPMENTS TOWARD 2009   87
Appendix     89
Literature     91
INTRODUCTION
1� years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the bilateral relations between 
the United States and Russia are still among the most important in world poli-
tics. Despite this, the relationship seems to be described more often than not in 
terms of crisis and conflict. The aim of this study is to look more closely at the 
American side of the relationship, and at the implications of US foreign policy 
for bilateral relations with Russia. The main argument will be that US Russia 
policy has influenced the relationship negatively. Although it seemed to be mov-
ing in a positive direction after the events of 9/11, several US actions, both in 
terms of its general foreign policy and Russia policy, have undermined positive 
future developments and cut the relationship short of its potential. The war on 
terror, which provided the initial impetus for closer US-Russia cooperation, in 
the end highlighted disagreement and conflicting interests rather than facilitat-
ing further rapprochement. The Russian focus on “hard security” issues and the 
preoccupation with traditional security policy have made cooperation look like 
a zero-sum game, and this has also diminished the level of trust in US-Russia 
relations, thus making cooperation more difficult in general. From a Russian 
strategic perspective, the United States, taking advantage of its position as the 
dominant military power and the most powerful actor in the international polit-
ical system, has been the driving force behind a geopolitical containment policy 
that has pushed Russian interests back all across Europe. 
 This new correlation of forces and the resulting dominant position gradu-
ally became clear to the United States during the 199�s; this opened up new 
possibilities for American foreign policy, but also created uncertainties regard-
ing identity and purpose. Redefining the role and priorities of the United States 
in the international system is still very much work in progress. This process has 
been evident to most of the US’ partners and allies, but it has probably been even 
more tangible for its former main adversary and counterpart from the Cold War, 
Russia. Coinciding with the rise of the United States, Russia has experienced a 
tremendous drop in international status and prestige; this emanates from the 
inherent difficulties of a state in transition and a vast array of political, economic 
and social problems inherited from the Soviet Union. For well over a decade, 
this was a trend of accelerating asymmetry between the former superpowers.1
1 This negative trend has been halted under President Vladimir Putin and 
started to change around ���3. Russia has reasserted itself and regained 
some of its former influence since. The additional bilateral implications of 
this will be discussed below.
INTRODUCTION
1� years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the bilateral relations between 
the United States and Russia are still among the most important in world poli-
tics. Despite this, the relationship seems to be described more often than not in 
terms of crisis and conflict. The aim of this study is to look more closely at the 
American side of the relationship, and at the implications of US foreign policy 
for bilateral relations with Russia. The main argument will be that US Russia 
policy has influenced the relationship negatively. Although it seemed to be mov-
ing in a positive direction after the events of 9/11, several US actions, both in 
terms of its general foreign policy and Russia policy, have undermined positive 
future developments and cut the relationship short of its potential. The war on 
terror, which provided the initial impetus for closer US-Russia cooperation, in 
the end highlighted disagreement and conflicting interests rather than facilitat-
ing further rapprochement. The Russian focus on “hard security” issues and the 
preoccupation with traditional security policy have made cooperation look like 
a zero-sum game, and this has also diminished the level of trust in US-Russia 
relations, thus making cooperation more difficult in general. From a Russian 
strategic perspective, the United States, taking advantage of its position as the 
dominant military power and the most powerful actor in the international polit-
ical system, has been the driving force behind a geopolitical containment policy 
that has pushed Russian interests back all across Europe. 
 This new correlation of forces and the resulting dominant position gradu-
ally became clear to the United States during the 199�s; this opened up new 
possibilities for American foreign policy, but also created uncertainties regard-
ing identity and purpose. Redefining the role and priorities of the United States 
in the international system is still very much work in progress. This process has 
been evident to most of the US’ partners and allies, but it has probably been even 
more tangible for its former main adversary and counterpart from the Cold War, 
Russia. Coinciding with the rise of the United States, Russia has experienced a 
tremendous drop in international status and prestige; this emanates from the 
inherent difficulties of a state in transition and a vast array of political, economic 
and social problems inherited from the Soviet Union. For well over a decade, 
this was a trend of accelerating asymmetry between the former superpowers.1
1 This negative trend has been halted under President Vladimir Putin and 
started to change around ���3. Russia has reasserted itself and regained 
some of its former influence since. The additional bilateral implications of 
this will be discussed below.
 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 3/2008 uS POlIcy tOwarD ruSSIa after 9/11
The Soviet Union and the Cold War were defining factors in US foreign 
policy for over four decades. By default, the Soviet perspective had to be taken 
into account in every foreign policy discussion, and consequently possible Soviet 
reactions were a permanent constraint on US foreign policy. Decisions taken in 
this period had to be appraised in terms of the potential Soviet responses, and 
such functioned as built-in checks on US policies. When this mechanism ceased 
to be relevant with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, the opportunity opened up for the United States to act more freely, and to 
some degree, less thoughtfully and cautiously, because the counterbalances to 
and constraints on American power were less clear than before. This has had 
serious implications for the conduct of US foreign policy and its relationship 
with Russia. 
Since the early 199�s, the US-Russia relationship has been riddled with 
setbacks and bad publicity, and this does not seem likely to change in the near 
future. Observers have continually described the bilateral relations in negative 
terms, and discussions have been had about chills, freezes, new Cold Wars and 
“who’s to blame for ‘losing’ Russia”. But what can reasonably be expected from 
this relationship? Russia expert and diplomat Thomas Graham provided this 
assessment:
It is hardly a secret that US-Russian relations are at one of their lowest ebbs – if 
not the lowest – since the end of the Cold War. Gratuitous anti-Americanism,         
once confined to the fringe, has in the past few months become regular fare for 
the mainstream Russian press, while Russophobia is increasingly penetrating 
into American discourse on Russian developments.�
This statement could easily have been taken from any of a large number of 
analyses of the US-Russia relationship from the last couple of years, but in fact 
it dates back to early ���1. Just a year later, in ����, there were serious dis-
cussions about a US-Russian strategic partnership in the global war on terror. 
However, when I started researching for this project, there was a debate about 
whether a new Cold War had started. This is indicative of the fluctuations and 
volatility of the relationship almost two decades after the Cold War ended. Why 
is this so? Any bilateral relationship consists of several levels of interaction, 
but the countries’ foreign policies, both in general and in terms of the policies 
directed specifically toward the other, are arguably of primary importance. On 
the US side, much time and effort has been spent on assessing the way in which 
� Thomas Graham, “US-Russia Relations”, speech given at Wilton Park 
Conference, 15 March ���1 (Institute for Korean-American Studies [online 1 
Apr ����]).
developments in Russian politics influence, or should influence, US policy to-
ward Russia. The National Security Strategy document from ����� states that 
“strengthening our relationship will depend on the policies, foreign and do-
mestic, that Russia adopts”.3 However, there are few attempts to account sys-
tematically for the way in which different aspects of US foreign policy influence 
Russian policies, which, to an outside observer, would seem to be an equally 
important aspect of the relationship. 
 
Structure
The aim of this study is to examine how US Russia policy has developed under 
the Bush administration, and how it has affected the overall relationship. Much 
of the existing work on US-Russian relations looks mainly in a reactive perspec-
tive at US policy toward Russia. However, viewing US policy merely as reactions 
to Russian policies omits the political context in which Russian policies are 
formulated. Existing work on the subject has less often inverted this perspective 
and looked at the contents and effects of US foreign policy toward Russia and 
the perceptions and effects of these policies at the domestic level in Russia itself. 
The aim of this study is therefore to provide an outline of the policies of the Bush 
administration, and to point out some political implications and basic mecha-
nisms that influence the development of the relationship. US foreign policy will 
be analyzed from two different angles: first and most importantly, US policies di-
rectly related to Russia (US-Russia policy); second, the relevant aspects of other 
American foreign policies that have more indirectly influenced Russia and her 
bilateral relations with the United States. The timeframe of the research project 
is from the inauguration of President George W. Bush in January ���1 up to the 
summer of �����. 
To develop a proper understanding of the intellectual context of US Russia 
policy, I shall establish a general framework for some different traditions and 
schools of thought within American foreign policy. This framework provides a 
backdrop against which some foreign-policy approaches toward Russia will be 
presented, discussed and reworked. These perspectives will then be used as the 
analytical framework for describing and analyzing US policies under the Bush 
administration. Within this process, I shall integrate official policy statements 
and documents to determine the guidelines for official US policy toward Russia 
at different points in time. To link official policy with the actual political devel-
opments, I shall provide an account of what constituted the main tenets of US 
3 Quote taken from the National Security Council: The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, 1�� March ����� (White House 
[online 1� Feb ����]), p. 39.
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policy toward Russia and shall attend in particular to the range of issues that 
was prioritized by the administration and that roughly correspond to central 
aspects of the bilateral relationship. These areas are: strategic arms control is-
sues; the alliance in the war against international terrorism; US policies toward 
former states of the Soviet Union; and energy cooperation.4 The first two aspects 
will be dealt with in more depth than the two other issues. In the case of strategic 
arms control, this will be done to highlight what both countries regarded as the 
most important area of cooperation. In the case of energy cooperation, the aim 
is to indicate the solidity, depth and possibilities for new areas of cooperation 
between the United States and Russia. In using these cases, I shall seek to deter-
mine what the dominant approaches toward Russia under the Bush administra-
tion have been by examining the competition and changing interplay between 
the different schools of thought on US Russia policy. Finally, I shall provide 
some thoughts about how these processes have influenced and defined US policy 
toward Russia, and their implications for the bilateral relationship.
The aim of these analyses is to understand the broader context within 
which the relationship has developed in an attempt to elaborate on the follow-
ing questions:
How has US Russia policy evolved between ���1 and �����?
What has been the dominant policy approach toward Russia in this pe-
riod? 
How have these policies influenced the bilateral relationship?
The main preliminary thesis of this study is that the unresolved tensions and 
constantly changing dynamics between the different approaches and schools of 
thought create a lack of consistency. This makes it difficult to understand the 
forces and intentions underlying US foreign policy. Although the flexibility of 
these foreign-policy shifts has proven to be a strength for the United States in 
other circumstances,5 it will be argued here that this has not been the case for 
US-Russian relations. In this case, the conflicting and contradictory tendencies 
of the foreign-policy process have made US policy toward Russia shifting and 
unpredictable, and therefore susceptible to misperception by Russian decision-
4 This is a tricky delimitation. First and foremost, the term “former states of 
the Soviet Union” is meant to cover the CIS area itself, but in some respects, 
for example regarding NATO expansion, I also imply the Baltic states, 
which have never been affiliated with the CIS. This is the main reason for 
explaining the use of this specific term here.
5 See Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and 
How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred Knopf, ���3), pp. 4�–44, for 




makers. From the Russian perspective, this has created uncertainty about the 
basic intentions of the US, and this situation has consistently failed to produce 
the necessary levels of trust for the relationship. An important factor at work 
here has been the strong and persisting presence of Wilsonian ideals in American 
foreign policy,�� and the use of the Wilsonian approach toward Russia and other 
former states of the Soviet Union. 
I shall argue that variations of a Wilsonian foreign policy employed with 
regard to Russia have in sum had a detrimental effect on the relationship. This 
effect has been caused mainly by what I would call the “Wilsonian dilemma” in 
US foreign policy. This dilemma is caused by the fact that it is generally difficult 
to be certain about the motives or intentions of one’s counterpart in internation-
al politics, and that this problem of interpretation and perception is particularly 
acute when actors face idealistic or altruistic policies. This problem of inter-
pretation is not new in international politics, and it is compounded by idealist 
rhetoric often being used to disguise or justify realist policies.� These factors, 
complicating the already difficult analysis of intentions, make it hard to obtain 
a good picture of one’s counterpart’s motives and intentions. In relationships 
without long-standing cooperation and little concrete basis, this creates infertile 
ground for building trust. Therefore, at the receiving end of Wilsonian policies 
there is always the possibility that other motives, more realpolitik-oriented ones, 
lie beneath. In the US-Russia relationship, this problem of interpretation may be 
linked to the existence of two of the foreign-policy approaches toward Russia 
that I shall discuss and elaborate on in the following chapter. In this sense, this 
study may be said to be located within the values-versus-interests conflict that 
has been an important dividing line in the debate about US foreign policy toward 
Russia; and, to a certain degree, it is also located within the general idealism-
versus-realism debate. Furthermore, talk of a strategic partnership between the 
two countries in the war against terror was not rooted in political reality, and 
therefore proved counterproductive in the end. There has also been a lack of 
�� Use of the term “Wilsonian” refers to elements of the foreign policy of 
President Woodrow Wilson, and will be explained in the next chapter 
outlining the theoretical framework.
� The point was made in 1939 by E.H. Carr. The mechanism, however, has 
probably been a prevalent problem in international relations for a longer 
time than this. See Carr’s The Twenty Year Crisis 1919–1939 (London: St 
Martin’s Press, 19�4).
 For recent examples of this debate, see the Council of Foreign Relations 
report Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should 
Do, CFR Independent Task Force Report, no. 5� (New York: CFR Press, 
�����) and the ”Great Russia Debate” that took place in the          Journal of 
International Security Affairs in �����-��. This debate included articles by 
Stephen Blank (no. 1�, Spring �����), Nikolas Gvosdev (no. 11, Fall �����) 
and a final retort by Stephen Blank (no. 1�, Spring ����).
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report Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should 
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willingness, or understanding, from the US to accept that Russia will follow its 
own priorities and national interests, even if they conflict with US interests. On 
too many issues, this is often confused as being an indication of a more assertive 
Russian foreign policy. In my view, it is futile to expect the Russian authorities 
to conduct US foreign policy.
PERSPECTIVES ON US FOREIGN POLICy 
In this chapter, some focal points and a background for the analysis of American 
foreign policy toward Russia will be established by providing a brief outline 
of a general approach to American foreign policy; a basic idea about the main 
debates, groups and dividing lines in contemporary foreign-policy debate in the 
United States will be provided. This, I hope, will help put into perspective the 
discussion about what the main schools of thought and guiding principles are in 
the development of US Russia policy. 
General perspectives on US foreign policy 
In his seminal work on the history of US foreign policy, Walter Russell Mead at-
tempts to go to the roots of American foreign policy and presents a new paradigm 
for thinking about this theme. 9 He distinguishes between four main schools of 
thought named after presidents who embodied important traits of their respec-
tive schools. He argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, foreign policy 
has historically played an important role in American domestic politics, and that 
it is possible to discern a number of foreign-policy perspectives that have had a 
lasting impact on both public opinion and decision-makers. These basic ways 
of looking at foreign policy have reflected contrasting and sometimes comple-
mentary ways of looking at domestic policy as well. Each is rooted in different 
economic, regional, cultural, and, in some cases, ethnic groups, and each has its 
own vision of American national interest. These schools of thought have influ-
enced the dynamics of and competed for dominance within American foreign 
policy.
1. The Hamiltonian school is built on the conviction of the primacy of interna-
tional economics. 1� It regards a strong alliance between the national government 
and big business as the key to both domestic stability through economic growth, 
and to effective action abroad. The Hamiltonians have long focused on the na-
tion’s need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms, and 
that the commercial interests of US companies should be a driver in American 
foreign policy. Hamiltonians also believed (and believe) that an effective interna-
tional trading system is more beneficial than the zero-sum game of international 
9 Mead, Special Providence.
1� The term Hamiltonian refer to Alexander Hamilton (1�5�–1�4). Hamilton 
was a leading politician during the early years of independence, and the first 
Secretary of the Treasury.
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politics that has traditionally engaged statesmen. The American role as main 
proponent of a global free trade system was largely inherited from Great Britain, 
as the British Empire’s own role and power in this system waned after the world 
wars. The Hamiltonian school of thought is often referred to as “American real-
ism”.
�. Wilsonians believe that the United States has both a moral obligation and an 
important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values 
throughout the world, thereby creating a peaceful international community that 
accepts the rule of law. 11 Spreading these values globally would in the long run 
increase the security of the United States and serve a double purpose. It was this 
school of thought in American foreign policy that first argued that democracies 
make better, more reliable and predictable partners than dictatorships, which 
did not reflect the real national interests of their countries. Although it has its 
roots in the American nineteenth-century missionary movement, the promotion 
of the values of the Declaration of Independence was made a guiding foreign-
policy principle in the interwar years. This Wilsonian grand strategy has been an 
important facet of US soft power and one of the main global attractions of what 
might be called American ideology.
3. Jeffersonians have the preservation of the unique form of American democ-
racy as their most central issue, and have historically been skeptical of Hamilto-
nian and Wilsonian policies that involve the United States with unsavory allies 
abroad that increase the risks of war.1� Jeffersonians see foreign entanglements 
as a threat to both American values and independence. They also fear that ex-
cessive engagements abroad would lead to more focus on military power and a 
stronger executive, which in turn could limit the power of congressional scrutiny 
and thus endanger democracy. Consequently, American foreign policy should be 
less concerned with promoting freedom and prosperity by exporting American 
values, and more concerned with safeguarding them at home. The United States 
should teach its values by leading by example, as a “shining city upon the hill” 
that other states might look to.13 Jeffersonians may be regarded as foreign-policy 
minimalists with elements of realism, for which the Monroe doctrine could serve 
11 The term Wilsonian refers to Woodrow Wilson (15��–19�4), the president 
of the United States from 1913–�1.
1� The term Jeffersonian refers to Thomas Jefferson (1�43–1���), president 
from 1�1–�9.
13 An almost classic quote in studies of US foreign policy. Originally from a 
work by John Winthrop in 1��3�.
as an example.14 In this regard, they operate with a narrowly defined set of 
national interests, and a domestic-policy focus on their foreign-policy priori-
ties. Jeffersonians will typically oppose foreign-policy objectives considered too 
ambitious and far-reaching, and encourage a reduction in international commit-
ments.
4. The group that Mead calls the Jacksonians believes that the most important 
goal of the US government in both foreign and domestic policy should be the 
economic well-being and physical security of the American people; this policy 
thus has a popular ideal at its core.15 Whereas Mead’s other approaches can 
be seen as having a somewhat elitist political base, the Jacksonian tradition is 
deeply rooted in frontier and folk culture, and thus represents more of a mass 
approach to politics and to foreign-policy thinking. Foreign engagements that 
do not clearly serve national interests – narrowly defined – will rarely mobilize 
Jacksonians. They prefer to avoid conflict with the outside world and often rail 
at the complications of economic engagement. However, they also believe that 
if war comes, the United States should deploy all necessary power in pursuit 
of victory. In this regard, the Jacksonians are the warriors of American society 
and proponents of strong and effective action. Jacksonians are protectionists 
opposed to Hamiltonian trade strategies, highly critical of the foreign-policy 
complexities of the Jeffersonians, and contemptuous of the Wilsonians for the 
naiveté of their attempt to promote democratic values abroad. While they may 
have a limited view of America’s global interests, and in this regard the approach 
has some elements of isolationism, they are prepared to act decisively if those 
interests are threatened. The use of military force is therefore regarded as a le-
gitimate solution to international conflicts of interest. This Jacksonian impulse 
has given political support to high military spending and legitimacy to the use of 
military force, and ultimately, made America’s rise to global primacy possible.
Mead’s classification splits the four approaches along the traditional main lines 
of what could be called an isolationist and a more internationalist school of 
thought. Here the Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian can be seen to be more in-
clined toward variations of isolationism (one liberal and one more conserva-
14 The Monroe Doctrine dates from 1�3, when President James Monroe 
proclaimed that European powers should no longer colonize or interfere with 
the affairs of the nations of the Americas. The United States planned to stay 
neutral in wars between European powers and their colonies. 
15 The term Jacksonian refers to Andrew Jackson (1����–145), who served as 
president from 1�9 to 13�.
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tive),1�� whereas the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian lean more toward an interna-
tionalist approach to foreign policy (one is focused on protecting commercial 
interests; the other, on promoting ideals). Moreover, the Wilsonian and Hamil-
tonian schools of thought are based on values of a distinctly universalist char-
acter and global appeal. However, the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian schools have 
a more indigenous value-base at their cores, albeit of different types. Both these 
approaches believe that the protection of the unique cultural, social and politi-
cal heritage of the United States should be the primary objective of US foreign 
policy. In sum, it is possible to say that both these schools of thought have an 
internal and domestic focus regarding foreign-policy priorities. 
The policy process stemming from Mead’s schools of thought resembles a 
mixture of a balancing act and a fierce competition between the proponents of 
the different types of policies. The approaches are present at the different stages 
of decision-making, and the resulting policies are a reflection of the demands 
of the concrete situation and the existing constellation of political forces at any 
given time. The strength of the different schools in the foreign-policy discourse 
generally reflects the importance of the special interests for which each school 
speaks, resulting in constant pressure on the policymaking process. In Mead’s 
view, this constant competition to influence US foreign policy has had a ben-
eficial effect on the final result in that “the endless, unplanned struggle among 
the schools and lobbies to shape American foreign policy ended up producing 
a policy that over the long run more closely approximated the true needs and 
interests of society than could any conscious design.1� The possibilities of com-
bining the approaches allow for flexibility in the short term, but also for con-
tinuities in the long run. In other words, Mead would claim that the successes 
of American foreign policy can be attributed to the United States having a truly 
democratic and responsive foreign-policy decision-making process, in which the 
most important interests and segments of society have the possibility to exert 
influence over foreign-policy issues.
One problem with Mead’s interpretation of American foreign policy, how-
ever, may be found in the way in which he deals with different versions of re-
alpolitik, which is often portrayed as a European invention and practice in his 
analysis. Mead claims that realpolitik has rarely had any appeal in the United 
States. This is a statement that would cause some consternation in many foreign-
policy analysts in many places. Even though Mead’s use of this term implies 
something other than what is commonly understood as realpolitik, it is none-
theless one of the weaker assertions in his interpretative analysis of US foreign 
1�� The term isolationist is somewhat strong here, and something along the lines 
of minimal internationalism would probably be more appropriate.
1� Mead, Special Providence, p. ��.
policy. This also opens up for interesting analyses. If realpolitik or realist think-
ing in foreign policy has been relatively unpopular in the United States, and 
US policymakers themselves conduct policies based on other intentions, what 
happens when other actors interpret US policies in the opposite direction, and 
perceive a foreign policy based on realist thinking? 
Perspectives on US policies toward Russia
In the early 199�s, after over forty years of Cold War, the intellectual, cultural 
and organizational challenges of reorienting foreign policy away from previous 
lines were enormous. In addressing this question, American leaders also faced 
an old dilemma: was the United States a traditional great power involved in the 
global game of power politics and balancing, or was the United States a unique 
case in international politics with a special mission to uphold high ideals and 
assist others to build democracies and develop market economies? The new in-
ternational roles of the former superpower adversaries also made the elabora-
tion of US Russia policy more complex. The supremacy of the United States in 
global affairs was in ascendance during the 199�s, coinciding with a formidable 
plunge in Russia’s status. 
In searching for a new strategy for American foreign policy after the Cold 
War, there seemed to be broad consensus about two basic propositions.1 The 
first one was the now undisputed role of the United States as the dominant mili-
tary power; the second was that a democratic and market-oriented Russia mov-
ing toward Western integration would serve American national interests. The 
concrete policy dilemmas that emanated from this consensus were to provide the 
main dividing lines in US Russia policy for a long time. The question was: what 
priority should be given to the promotion of Russian transformation and inte-
gration, compared to policies directed at preserving the emerging and favorable 
international position of the United States? 
There are a number of approaches to choose from when selecting theoreti-
cal perspectives on general US foreign policy since the body of scholarly work 
on this subject is so large. However, there is less relevant and usable material 
specifically about perspectives, groups and dividing lines in US policy toward 
Russia, probably because a more nuanced approach must be employed to ana-
lyze a more specific policy. In the following, I shall use existing literature on 
the subject and material gathered from interviews to develop a typology that 
1 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose. US Policy 
toward Russia after the Cold War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, ���3), p. 5.
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covers the main schools of thought and dividing lines in recent American Russia 
policy. 
 As with the general foreign-policy approaches, the most important bone 
of contention is whether US policies toward Russia should be based on values or 
interests. This of course also echoes the general debate in international-relations 
theory about idealism or realism as theoretical approaches, as well as the main 
dividing lines in Mead’s exposition. This approach has been used as an analyti-
cal framework for earlier studies of US Russia policy,19 but this tends to conceal 
other important aspects of contending strategies regarding how to engage and 
deal with Russia from a US foreign-policy perspective. It also says too little 
about the political differences between the groups of policymakers and differing 
opinions about what types of goals to pursue in US-Russian relations. A typol-
ogy such as this oversimplifies a complex reality, since there will often be ele-
ments from both a values-based and an interest-based policy and varying power 
relations at work in the policy-formation process. 
To develop analytical categories, one should attempt to integrate different 
types of interests and degrees of engagement into a single framework. Earlier ty-
pologies developed to distinguish between different schools of thought in the US 
foreign-policy community are useful to describe only some aspects of foreign-
policy thinking toward Russia. Of the research that I shall expand upon here, 
Thomas Graham’s approach is central. According to Graham,�� there are four 
schools of thought regarding how to deal with Russia in the US foreign-policy 
community: 
the “forget Russia” school, which would not devote much time or energy to 
Russia in the belief that she simply does not matter that much any longer; 
the “proto-containment school”, which believes that no matter what hap-
pens, Russia is bound to be a problem for the United States and therefore 
the goal should be to limit the damage Russia can do to US interests; 
the “selective engagement” school, which would engage only on issues of 
key interest to the United States, largely in the security realm; and 
the “broad engagement” school, which advocates engagement over a wide 
range of issues in the belief that only such an approach can restore the level 
of trust necessary for progress on first-order security priorities.
Graham’s approach mainly describes the degree of engagement the US should 
seek, thereby focusing on the breadth of the bilateral agenda and the number of 
19 See for example Paige B. Sullivan, US-Russia Relations: From Idealism to 
Realism (Washington DC: CSIS Press, ����).
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issue areas US foreign policy should try to develop in cooperation with Russia. 
Although Graham’s approach provides insights gained from both a theoretical 
and practical perspective, it is somewhat one-dimensional, and could benefit 
from elaboration. 
Goldgeier and McFaul employ two categories; they argue that the main 
policy dividing line runs between regime transformers and power balancers.�1 
Here, the category of regime transformers is roughly synonymous with Wilsoni-
ans, who believe that American leaders should use the full gamut of American 
non-military power to help bring about the internal transformation of Russia. 
Regime transformers will also claim that a market-oriented Russia would open 
up to international trade and seek membership of multilateral institutions like 
the World Trade Organization in the longer term. The successful consolidation 
of democracy and the market would reduce the risks of confrontation, and make 
Russia’s military capabilities an irrelevant issue. However, power balancers 
would argue against the wisdom of the missionary zeal of the regime transform-
ers. The argument employed is that the nature of Russia’s domestic regime as a 
single factor would not dictate its foreign-policy choices or shape international 
behavior. The task of transforming Russia would also be too daunting, and 
would lie beyond the influence of the United States. Instead, focus should be on 
the balance of power between the United States and Russia, and the greater the 
imbalance in favor of the United States, the better. This implies more emphasis 
on securing and destroying Russia’s nuclear stockpile, as well as supporting and 
ensuring the independence of the new states along Russian borders.�� 
Goldgeier and McFaul’s approach is guided more by policy content and 
goals than by Graham’s level of engagement, and also reflects the basic interests-
versus-values conflict in the US foreign-policy debate. However, to acquire a 
more comprehensive typology, it would be more fruitful to combine these two 
approaches and develop a new one, containing both the level of engagement 
and the different types of interests that motivate actors in their dealings with 
Russia. 
Based upon the research discussed briefly above and on my own research 
and interviews I have conducted, I shall employ the following four categories in 
my analysis of American policy toward Russia: 
1. Integrationists. The integrationists emphasize integrating Russia into Western 
political and economic institutions to ensure a positive development in Russia 
over the long term. This group also advocates engagement on a broad range of 
issues. The belief in the importance of integration and engagement does not in-
�1 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose.
�� Ibid., p. 5.
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volve the internal transformation of the Russian regime as a precondition. The 
integrationist approach has an overall focus on the internal policies of Russia. 
To some extent, this category conforms to what Graham calls the “broad en-
gagement” school,�3 but as it is employed and understood here, it also includes 
political preferences concerning Russia’s internal developments. This group of 
policymakers (and scholars) argues that engagement is important in itself as a 
political tool, and that an interventionist approach to domestic issues in Russia 
would be both futile and counterproductive. The integrationist approach to 
some extent provides support and opportunities for commercial interests to en-
gage with Russia, since it is difficult to imagine meaningful integration without 
substantial economic cooperation. To some extent, the integrationist approach 
has certain similarities with Hamiltonian thinking, in that it supports commer-
cial interests. 
�. Transformationalists. This group believes in the importance of integrating 
Russia and includes actors who regard regime transformation as a precondition 
for meaningful integration and engagement. Transformationalists focus more 
on internal political developments and the necessity of continued reforms, and 
believe that an unreformed Russia would be a more difficult actor to cooperate 
with to achieve concrete results. The transformationalist approach focuses on 
the link between the internal and the external policies of Russia. This view is 
one of the main arguments advocated in the Council of Foreign Relation’s report 
on Russia.�4 
The transformationalists would also argue that a democratic Russia would 
pursue a different foreign policy and not pose a threat to American interests. 
Consequently, the US should work toward bringing about a domestic regime 
transformation to realize the full potential of US-Russian cooperation. As it 
was briefly pointed out above, variations of Wilsonian idealism are a prevalent 
theme in American foreign-policy thinking, and political pressure in this direc-
tion seems to be present in the American political system almost as if by de-
fault. This school of thought would also be more focused on criticizing domestic 
policies in Russia, and work toward trying to facilitate regime change along 
democratic lines. For this group of policymakers, regime change is a means of 
enhancing American national security, in addition to the purely idealistic aspects 
of supporting the spread of democracy.
3. Pragmatists. The pragmatists do not view internal developments and regime 
transformation in Russia as more important than achieving concrete results by 
�3 Graham, “US-Russia Relations”: 5.
�4 Council on Foreign Relations, Russia’s Wrong Direction, p. 35. 
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cooperating on selected issues. In this regard, the group mirrors Graham’s “se-
lective engagement” category, but it also covers aspects of the “forget Russia” 
category, with the implication that it is only worth seeking out cooperation on 
those bilateral issues where there is a minimum of common interests present that 
could produce concrete results. This approach also implies that the US should 
not spend resources and seek to engage Russia on issues where the potential is 
of little significance and importance to US interests. Furthermore, it also means 
that there are issues where it is not necessary to consult Russia to achieve US 
goals. This category therefore covers elements of realist political thinking, and 
from the Russian perspective, also elements of what could be termed US uni-
lateralism. Among the pragmatists, there is usually a focus on Russia’s external 
policies, and on security-related issues.
4. Primacists. �5 The primacists’ main aim is to seek to preserve America’s cur-
rent hegemony and prevent any challenges – or challengers – from arising and 
this has traditionally been one of the main tenets of US foreign-policy thinking 
both during and since the end of the Cold War.��� The perspective is based mainly 
on a unilateralist approach to international relations, and the general preference 
would be for the US to operate without any international constraints. Such uni-
lateralism also implies a zero-sum approach to politics, and there is little room 
for anything but US perspectives and national interests. This group of policy-
makers doubts the usefulness of security cooperation with Russia other than 
on an ad-hoc basis. It also has similarities with what Graham calls the “proto-
containment” school of thought, involving limited Russian influence in regional 
and international affairs being seen as positive in terms of ensuring a balance of 
power in favor of the US. Therefore, the primacist category embraces elements 
of what Goldgeier and McFaul call “power balancers”.�� Overall, a focus on the 
external policies of Russia is implied in the primacist approach. 
The categories I have suggested here will function in the following chapters 
as benchmarks for describing important currents within different areas of US 
Russia policy. In my view, they should not be regarded as anything more than 
tools of simplification adopted to reduce the complexity of analysis. 
�5 The term is used in Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War. 
Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? (New York and London: Routledge, 
����), p. 1��, as one of the subcategories of American unilateralist policy 
perspectives.
��� See for example John Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier”, 
Foreign Affairs, vol �, no. 5 (���1) on this subject.
�� Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 5. 
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 21
volve the internal transformation of the Russian regime as a precondition. The 
integrationist approach has an overall focus on the internal policies of Russia. 
To some extent, this category conforms to what Graham calls the “broad en-
gagement” school,�3 but as it is employed and understood here, it also includes 
political preferences concerning Russia’s internal developments. This group of 
policymakers (and scholars) argues that engagement is important in itself as a 
political tool, and that an interventionist approach to domestic issues in Russia 
would be both futile and counterproductive. The integrationist approach to 
some extent provides support and opportunities for commercial interests to en-
gage with Russia, since it is difficult to imagine meaningful integration without 
substantial economic cooperation. To some extent, the integrationist approach 
has certain similarities with Hamiltonian thinking, in that it supports commer-
cial interests. 
�. Transformationalists. This group believes in the importance of integrating 
Russia and includes actors who regard regime transformation as a precondition 
for meaningful integration and engagement. Transformationalists focus more 
on internal political developments and the necessity of continued reforms, and 
believe that an unreformed Russia would be a more difficult actor to cooperate 
with to achieve concrete results. The transformationalist approach focuses on 
the link between the internal and the external policies of Russia. This view is 
one of the main arguments advocated in the Council of Foreign Relation’s report 
on Russia.�4 
The transformationalists would also argue that a democratic Russia would 
pursue a different foreign policy and not pose a threat to American interests. 
Consequently, the US should work toward bringing about a domestic regime 
transformation to realize the full potential of US-Russian cooperation. As it 
was briefly pointed out above, variations of Wilsonian idealism are a prevalent 
theme in American foreign-policy thinking, and political pressure in this direc-
tion seems to be present in the American political system almost as if by de-
fault. This school of thought would also be more focused on criticizing domestic 
policies in Russia, and work toward trying to facilitate regime change along 
democratic lines. For this group of policymakers, regime change is a means of 
enhancing American national security, in addition to the purely idealistic aspects 
of supporting the spread of democracy.
3. Pragmatists. The pragmatists do not view internal developments and regime 
transformation in Russia as more important than achieving concrete results by 
�3 Graham, “US-Russia Relations”: 5.
�4 Council on Foreign Relations, Russia’s Wrong Direction, p. 35. 
3/2008 uS POlIcy tOwarD ruSSIa after 9/11
cooperating on selected issues. In this regard, the group mirrors Graham’s “se-
lective engagement” category, but it also covers aspects of the “forget Russia” 
category, with the implication that it is only worth seeking out cooperation on 
those bilateral issues where there is a minimum of common interests present that 
could produce concrete results. This approach also implies that the US should 
not spend resources and seek to engage Russia on issues where the potential is 
of little significance and importance to US interests. Furthermore, it also means 
that there are issues where it is not necessary to consult Russia to achieve US 
goals. This category therefore covers elements of realist political thinking, and 
from the Russian perspective, also elements of what could be termed US uni-
lateralism. Among the pragmatists, there is usually a focus on Russia’s external 
policies, and on security-related issues.
4. Primacists. �5 The primacists’ main aim is to seek to preserve America’s cur-
rent hegemony and prevent any challenges – or challengers – from arising and 
this has traditionally been one of the main tenets of US foreign-policy thinking 
both during and since the end of the Cold War.��� The perspective is based mainly 
on a unilateralist approach to international relations, and the general preference 
would be for the US to operate without any international constraints. Such uni-
lateralism also implies a zero-sum approach to politics, and there is little room 
for anything but US perspectives and national interests. This group of policy-
makers doubts the usefulness of security cooperation with Russia other than 
on an ad-hoc basis. It also has similarities with what Graham calls the “proto-
containment” school of thought, involving limited Russian influence in regional 
and international affairs being seen as positive in terms of ensuring a balance of 
power in favor of the US. Therefore, the primacist category embraces elements 
of what Goldgeier and McFaul call “power balancers”.�� Overall, a focus on the 
external policies of Russia is implied in the primacist approach. 
The categories I have suggested here will function in the following chapters 
as benchmarks for describing important currents within different areas of US 
Russia policy. In my view, they should not be regarded as anything more than 
tools of simplification adopted to reduce the complexity of analysis. 
�5 The term is used in Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War. 
Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? (New York and London: Routledge, 
����), p. 1��, as one of the subcategories of American unilateralist policy 
perspectives.
��� See for example John Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier”, 
Foreign Affairs, vol �, no. 5 (���1) on this subject.
�� Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 5. 
22 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
Contextual factors
Furthermore, some important factors shaping US policy toward Russia during 
the late 199�s as well as the period covered by this study should be pointed 
out. 
The first is the growing asymmetry of power between the countries, which 
was no obvious fact in the early 199�s, because at that time there was still con-
siderable uncertainty about the real balance of power between Russia and the 
United States. Over time, and especially under President Clinton’s second term, 
it became more evident that the US was leaving Russia behind on almost all im-
portant dimensions of power. The perceptions of this balance of power changed 
more slowly than the actual balance, and this caused a lag that in fact functioned 
as a constraint on the Clinton administration’s Russia policy. By the end of the 
199�s, it had became clear that Russia possessed little capacity to influence US 
foreign policy, even on issues within Russia’s traditional spheres of influence.� 
The second is the direction of Russia’s development, and in the extension 
of this, the degree of threat emanating from Russia. As the 199�s progressed, 
the initial fears of a resurgent communist or a future fascist Russia seemed mis-
founded, and that at least rudimentary forms of democracy and capitalism had 
been established. This line of thinking linked domestic political developments 
and regime type with the way in which Russia conducted its foreign policy, and 
thereby also how serious a threat it could pose to the United States and the inter-
national system. This had obvious implications for how the United States chose 
(and still chooses) to deal with Russia and how US Russia policy is formulated. 
The third factor is Russia’s overall importance to the US foreign-policy 
agenda. This is a function of the first two factors discussed here, but it is also 
determined by developments in other sectors of US foreign policy. 
� Ibid., p. 15.
US RUSSIA POLICy 2001–2006
In this chapter I shall provide an overview of the developments in US Russia pol-
icy in the period ���1–�����. First, however, I shall briefly summarize the Russia 
policies of the preceding administrations of President George Bush (199–1993) 
and Bill Clinton (1993–���1) to place the following discussion into some per-
spective, and to try to identify which of the four approaches has been prevalent 
during the different stages of the period and in the various areas of US-Russian 
relations. 
Policies under previous administrations
During the Cold War, US policy toward the USSR was largely shaped by the 
containment strategy, based on the US commitment to limiting or halting the ex-
pansion of Soviet power and communist ideology in the world. The temperature 
of this Cold War relationship varied; there were periods of détente, when US 
policies shifted more in the direction of accommodative diplomacy, and when 
tensions were lower. 
When the George H.W. Bush administration took office in 199, there 
was a new period of détente in US-Soviet relations, initiated by the changes 
in the Soviet leadership a few years earlier and Mikhail Gorbachev’s work to 
reform the Soviet economy and political institutions. From the outset, the Bush 
administration dealt with the Soviet Union in the rival superpower perspective, 
in which a new strategic balance was sought through nuclear and conventional 
disarmament deals. As Gorbachev had to face growing domestic challenges to 
the legitimacy of the Soviet political system, the position of the Bush administra-
tion remained conservative, and maintained a focus on Gorbachev as the only 
serious partner for dialogue. The demise of the Soviet empire in Central Europe 
and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 caught the administra-
tion largely by surprise. In this situation, their main fear was that the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union could lead to chaos, in the wake of which Soviet nuclear 
weapons could slip away from central control. This issue remained a US policy 
priority even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union had been finalized and 
Boris Yeltsin had replaced Gorbachev as the main interlocutor in what had by 
that time become US-Russian relations. Both sides agreed upon the principle that 
all former Soviet nuclear weapons would come under Russian control, thereby 
reducing the risks of proliferation and ensuring a single command and control 
system. In 199�, this continued to be a dominant theme, but toward the end of 
the Bush administration other policy issues crept onto the bilateral agenda. At 
this point there was growing criticism of the lack of US support for the domestic 
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political and economic reform processes in Russia. The Bush administration, 
being reluctant to invest more than rhetoric in Russian domestic reforms and 
uncertain of the actual strength of their influence over Russian development, 
continued to emphasize Russian foreign policy and not its internal transforma-
tion.�9 The administration did not attempt to promote regime change within the 
area of the former Soviet Union, and concentrated on dealing with important 
security issues stemming from the dissolution of the Soviet empire.
The Bush administration would come under the realist part of the analyti-
cal framework I employ here. It can be debated whether pragmatists or prima-
cists were at the helm of US Russia policy in this period, but in my view it is 
clear that the pragmatists were prevalent on most issues and this is mainly due 
to the importance of security-related issues on which cooperative solutions were 
sought, but also to pragmatists occupying central positions in the foreign-policy 
establishment having a strong pragmatist alliance in President Bush, Secretary of 
State James Baker III and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.3� However, 
this did not prevent other key players in the Bush administration from working 
toward more primacist-oriented goals. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and 
then Undersecretary for Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, were clearly in favor of this 
idea. The work involved in formulating the Pentagon document “Defense Strat-
egy for the 199�s” revolved largely around the principle of preventing potential 
rival powers from emerging, particularly in the military sphere.31 This was also 
related to the Pentagon view of Russia as a potential reemerging threat. 
The policy line changed fundamentally when the Clinton administration 
came to power in 1993. President Clinton was in many respects a Wilsonian 
liberal, and in terms of US-Russia relations he may be categorized as somewhere 
between an integrationist and a transformationist, depending on where in his 
presidency the assessment is made. Initially, Clinton favored integration preced-
ing reforms, in the belief that integration would promote and foster internal 
transformation. Russia’s transition to democracy and a market economy be-
came a key priority for the new administration, which saw a democratic regime 
change in Russia as a possible basis for a new security relationship. Unlike the 
Bush administration, Clinton and his team were determined to pursue policies 
designed to assist Russia’s dual transition as an important means of integrating 
Russia. This determination resulted in a comprehensive aid package at the start 
of Clinton’s presidency in 1993, though this was never repeated. Supporting 
President Yeltsin as the guarantor of continued reforms and a westward orien-
�9 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 9-11.
3� Ibid.
31 Patrick Tyler, “US Strategy Calls for Ensuring No Rivals Develop”, New 
York Times,  March 199�. 
tation was a stable feature of US Russia policy under Clinton, despite several 
instances of Russian actions suggesting the opposite, most notably the shelling 
of parliament in 1993 and the first Chechen war in 1994.
The initial enthusiasm for the promotion of democracy and a market econ-
omy gradually gave way to a growing disenchantment. The financial collapse in 
Russia in 199 demonstrated the weaknesses of the economy and the fragility of 
the embryonic market institutions. This was a forewarning of events that would 
later take place within several spheres of interaction, contributing to a cooling 
down of the relationship. The expansion of NATO to include Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic in 1999 demonstrated that President Clinton was not 
restricted in his defense of US national interests, despite strong Russian objec-
tions. Russian opposition to the NATO air campaign in Serbia in 1999 also 
substantially chilled relations with the US. Russia accused the US of aggression 
toward a sovereign state under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, an 
interpretation of events not uncommon in Russian analyses of US foreign-policy 
intentions. 3� Later, the launch of the second Chechen war, followed by human 
rights’ violations and a crackdown on media freedom, put an end to any remain-
ing illusions of democratic consolidation in Russia. It seemed that by the fall of 
1999, Clinton’s Russia policy had ground to a halt, leaving the administration’s 
attempts to support Russia’s domestic transitions in disrepute.33 Neither was 
the US-Russia relationship embraced by Yeltsin’s newly appointed successor, 
Vladimir Putin. For most of his first year in office, President Putin refused to 
take part in any new initiatives with Clinton, whom the Russians viewed as a 
classic lame-duck president.34
Foreign policy preparations and agenda
When President George W. Bush took office on �� January ���1, he inherited a 
difficult bilateral relationship fraught with disappointments. Clinton’s transfor-
mationalist policy toward Russia had stranded in 199 when the Russian econ-
omy collapsed, and the administration never managed to recreate a new positive 
dynamic in US-Russia relations. This policy of transformation demonstrated the 
difficulties and complexities in conducting a foreign policy based on facilitating 
the reform of Russia’s economy and political system. But it also demonstrated 
3� This is a good example of how Wilsonian politics can be interpreted, and 
the analysis quoted here may serve as an example of what I have called the 
Wilsonian dilemma.
33 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 11–13.
34 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand. A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy 
(New York: Random House, ����), p. 4.
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�9 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 9-11.
3� Ibid.
31 Patrick Tyler, “US Strategy Calls for Ensuring No Rivals Develop”, New 
York Times,  March 199�. 
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3� This is a good example of how Wilsonian politics can be interpreted, and 
the analysis quoted here may serve as an example of what I have called the 
Wilsonian dilemma.
33 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 11–13.
34 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand. A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy 
(New York: Random House, ����), p. 4.
26 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
how little influence the US actually had on domestic developments in Russia, a 
lesson the incoming administration intended to learn.
Before the new Bush administration took office, the process of devising 
a new foreign policy was mainly conducted by Condoleezza Rice, who served 
as Bush’s leading campaign adviser on international affairs. Rice, with Paul 
Wolfowitz, ran the main working group that elaborated what was to be the 
foreign policy of the Bush administration.35 She summarized the views of this 
group in an article in Foreign Affairs in early ����. In the article, Rice argued 
that a new Republican administration should return to the basics of defending 
national interests with the pragmatic realism that had guided US foreign policy 
since the end of the Second World War.3�� Views on Russia revolved around the 
idea that the United States should “focus its energies on comprehensive relation-
ships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold 
the character of the international political system.”3� Russia, however, was seen 
as a great power riddled with weaknesses and threatened by possible destabili-
zation. Rice argued that many of Russia’s weaknesses were associated with the 
Clinton administration’s exaggerated focus on relations with President Yeltsin 
to the detriment of overall reform efforts. She called for a disengagement from 
Russia’s domestic policies, and although she underlined the necessity of reforms, 
it was left largely up to the Russians themselves to sort these problems out; she 
added that it could take at least a generation for the cultural preconditions for 
democracy to take hold in Russian society,3 a point of view that changed signifi-
cantly by the start of President Bush’s second term. 
In the meantime, US policy should focus on security issues, such as safe-
guarding the Russian nuclear stockpile and preparing for a changing nuclear 
threat, with more countries becoming nuclear powers.39 At the center of this 
perception lay the emerging possibility of “rogue states” like Iran, Iraq and 
North Korea becoming nuclear powers. In the US-Russia relationship this also 
35 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans. The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New 
York: Penguin, ���4), p. �5�. In addition to Rice and Wolfowitz, the group 
consisted of Richard Armitage, Richard Perle, Dov Zakheim, Stephen 
Hadley, Robert Blackwill and Robert Zoellick. Regarding other important 
future players, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld played central roles in the 
foreign-policy elaboration, whereas Colin Powell did not seem to be involved 
to the same extent in the process. 
3�� Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign ����: Promoting the National Interest”, 
Foreign Affairs, vol. �9, no. 1 (����).
3� Ibid.: 4�.
3 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. �45.
39 This implied a continuation of the successful Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program (popularly known as the Nunn-Lugar program) that was started 
in 199�. The program aimed at securing and dismantling weapons of mass 
destruction in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. 
had implications for the continued existence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM Treaty),4� which was threatened by the desire of the US to develop a mis-
sile-defense system to protect against attacks by these rogue states. Rice wrote 
that the treaty was a “relic of an adversarial relationship” aimed at ensuring a 
“continued working deterrence during the Cold War”, and that it was no longer 
necessary. According to Rice and the Bush foreign-policy team, the treaty needed 
to be changed or abrogated in full, either cooperatively, or if necessary, unilater-
ally.41 Rice also claimed that Russia had a problematic track record on prolifera-
tion that could cause problems for cooperation with the United States. Addition-
ally, the Second Chechen War that started in 1999 was seen as “a reminder of 
the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America’s interest 
in their independence.”4� Rice also pointed out that criticism and tougher action 
was needed to stop Russia carrying out its campaign in Chechnya; this included 
the possibility of halting international financial assistance to Russia.43
One study of the incoming Bush administration’s views on Russia policy 
made it clear that “Russia represents neither a central threat to American inter-
ests, nor a clear opportunity for achieving them across the board”. 44 Russia’s 
place on the US policy agenda was seen as a function of different factors. Rus-
sia’s weakness was one reason why it would play a less central role for the 
United States, and “the direct importance of Russia had therefore diminished 
on many issues, as it instead emerged in the context of other issues or relation-
ships.” The administration’s view of Russia as a potential source of proliferation 
was underlined as a concern, and dealing with this would be an important facet 
of US Russia policy, especially in the case of Iran, which had been a constant 
problem for the Clinton administration.45 The possibility of withdrawing from 
the ABM Treaty was left open, and NATO expansion was viewed by the Bush 
administration as a priority, with the interests of the alliance and the potential 
European candidates in focus. Russian concerns about and objections to this 
matter were not at the center of US attention. 
4� Signed in 19�� by the United States and the Soviet Union, the Anti Ballistic 
Missile Treaty stipulated limitations on the development and testing of 
missile defense systems in the two countries. The original treaty allowed 
for � such systems in each country, limited to 1�� interceptor missiles and 
1�� launchers at each site. The US did not activate any such system, but the 
Soviet Union deployed a regional missile defense system around Moscow in 
the 19��s.
41 Rice, “Campaign ����”: 54.
4� Ibid.: 54.
43 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. �45.
44 Celeste Wallander, “An Overview of Bush Administration Policy and 
Priorities on Russia”, Ponars Policy Memo, no. 1�, 1 March ���1 (CSIS 
[online 15 Nov �����]).
45 Ibid.: �.
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An important point in the study was the new administration’s concern 
about Russia’s relations to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Respecting 
their independence and sovereignty was regarded as important both for their 
own development and for Russia’s. The view was that Russian dominance in 
economic and political affairs in this area would be inconsistent with continued 
reforms in Russia itself, and if Russia were to use its influence to interfere in 
these states, this would conflict with US interests in the region. With regard to 
Russia’s own transformations, administration officials argued that there was not 
much that the United States could do to influence this. However, Russia integrat-
ing with the West was seen as important, not only from the economic perspec-
tive, but also from the perspective of norms and values that were central for the 
development of democracy and the protection of human rights. This perspective 
placed Chechnya on the agenda of the new Bush administration.4�� 
These sources provide some indications of the changes and possible new 
directions of US policy towards Russia. The issues related to Russia that Rice’s 
article raises points in the direction of an approach oriented toward great-power 
cooperation and a focus on security issues. On the issue of internal reform, Rice 
indicated that a long-term perspective was necessary, which can hardly be called 
transformationalist. However, it seems clear that the administration wanted to 
stay out of Russian domestic politics and not interfere in the reform process, and 
instead focus on Russia’s external policies. Demonstrating a clear break with the 
transformationalist policies of the Clinton administration was important, and 
the return to realism in US foreign policy that Rice advocated also points in this 
direction. The Bush foreign-policy team gave missile defense top priority in its 
relations with Russia, implying a focus on a host of related security issues. Over-
all, the desire to move away from the Clinton administration’s policies and the 
centrality of classic security issues place the incoming Bush administration in the 
pragmatist tradition. However, by prioritizing Chechnya and Russia’s policies in 
the post-Soviet space, there were also minor elements of a more value-centered 
transformationalist approach to Russia, and the rhetorical picture of US-Russia 
policy was therefore mixed at the outset, although leaning toward a pragmatist 
perspective. 
US Russia policy before 9/11
After a brief synopsis of the foreign-policy thinking of the incoming Bush ad-
ministration, I shall provide an overview of the administration’s foreign-policy 
priorities prior to 9/11. This will provide a benchmark of the way in which the 
administration viewed Russia and how it planned to deal with it, without look-
4�� Ibid.
ing at the relationship through the prism of the war on terror. To keep the out-
line focused and coherent, I shall deal with the subject matter thematically, not 
chronologically, and the selection of issues reflects the priorities of the admin-
istration. To evaluate US Russia policy in the period ���1–�����, I shall focus 
on four different aspects of the relationship, namely strategic nuclear issues, the 
war on terror, US policies toward the New Independent States (NIS) and energy 
cooperation. These issues represent priorities at different points in time during 
the Bush presidency, and can therefore function as indicators of the development 
of US policies in the period in question. 
It became clear at a relatively early stage of the Bush administration that 
Russia was not high on the list of American foreign-policy priorities. To some 
extent, the incoming administration seemed to be making a point of ignoring 
Russia altogether. When the Bush administration took office, Russian officials 
in the Kremlin eagerly sought out an opportunity for a meeting between the two 
presidents, only to find their efforts resisted.4� After Bush took office, the White 
House ordered a review of all policies on and aid programs for Russia.4 This 
seemed to signal a cutback in aid and cooperation, especially when viewed in 
the light of the promise to disengage from domestic politics in Russia. However, 
this policy review never materialized, which was a contrast to the first Bush 
and Clinton administrations, under which dedicated Russia strategies and policy 
statements were worked out regularly and published every two or three years. 
Nonetheless, the State Department was reorganized; the formerly independent 
office of the Special Adviser for the NIS was merged with the general Bureau of 
European Affairs. Similar moves were taken at the NSC as well, signaling less 
focus on Russian affairs. 
Other disturbing signals came from top officials of the administration. 
Newly appointed National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, said in an inter-
view in February ���1 that “Russia constitutes a threat to the West in general 
and to America’s European allies in particular.” CIA director George Tenet ech-
oed these comments in a US Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing. Tenet 
claimed that Russia was selling sophisticated weapons technology to Libya, Iran 
and China, and that it was actively trying to halt American influence in post-
Soviet states.49 Comments like these did not bode particularly well for the bilat-
eral relationship under the new administration.
4� Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 
���3), pp. 19��–9�, ���.
4 This is routinely performed by each incoming administration in most issue 
areas.
49 Both citations quoted from Jeremy Bransten, “Observers Overview 
Relations”, US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 19 February ���1 (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 1� Jun ����]).
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President Bush outlined his foreign-policy goals for the first time in a 
speech to State Department personnel late in February. There were references 
to the importance of Russia because of its large nuclear weapons arsenal and its 
transition toward democracy and a free-market system. 5� In other speeches, the 
Bush administration had repeatedly spoken about the diminished relevance of 
the existing arms control regimes, and had called for moving beyond the ABM 
Treaty; this had been indicated in several speeches and studies even before the 
administration took office.
NMD AND THE ROLE OF THE ABM TREATy
Over the course of the first nine months of ���1, issues related to strategic 
arms control made up the bulk of the bilateral agenda with Russia. The ABM 
Treaty in its existing format was the main obstacle to the Bush administration 
achieving one of its main campaign promises. To deliver on this, the United 
States needed to start more advanced testing and eventually deploy a national 
missile-defense system (NMD). The issue had been controversial and fiercely 
debated domestically at the start of the 19��s when the ABM Treaty came into 
force. Moot points included the feasibility and effectiveness of such a system and 
the enormous costs of its development. The issue resurfaced during the Reagan 
presidency as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and was used very efficiently 
by the president, who managed to bring Mikhail Gorbachev to the negotiating 
table on additional reductions of nuclear arms in the mid-�s.51 
The new administration’s main argument was that the most urgent threat 
in the post-Cold War era stemmed from a small number of missiles in the hands 
of states like Iran, Iraq and North Korea, collectively termed “rogue states” 
at the time. This threat assessment increased the possibility of an unintended 
missile launch from Russia and stimulated a renewed interest in developing mis-
sile defense. Russia, China and the European allies of the United States were 
negative to the idea; the threat assessment of the activities of the rogue states 
was met with skepticism and there were concerns about the implications mis-
sile defense would have on international stability in general. In a speech at the 
5� President Bush address to State Department personnel, 15th February, ���1. 
Quoted from Frank Csongos, “Bush Outlines Broad Foreign Policy Goals”, 
US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 1�� February ���1 (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty [online �� Mar ����]).
51 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 
�����), pp. ��5–�. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was 
proposed by President Reagan in 19�, and talks on this treaty took place 
sporadically during the 19�s. Although Gorbachev was adamant in his 
opposition to SDI, the issue probably softened his attitudes toward overall 
reductions. A final START treaty was signed in 1991, five months before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
National Defense University in Washington DC, President Bush argued the case 
for developing a national missile-defense system and underlined the importance 
of extensive consultations with other nations as the US prepared to proceed to 
build the system. The first step in this direction would be renegotiating or ab-
rogating the ABM Treaty. Since Russia, as the only other effective party to the 
treaty would be the prime interlocutor on this issue, the speech also contained 
several passages on Russia: 
Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. Its government is no longer Com-
munist. Its president is elected. Today’s Russia is not our enemy, but a country in 
transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation, democratic, at peace 
with itself and its neighbors.5�
It was obvious that the United States needed to engage its major international 
partners and allies in a dialogue on the issue. Speaking of the necessity to consult 
with other states on the development of missile defense, Bush said:
… These will be real consultations. We are not presenting our friends and allies 
with unilateral decisions already made ... Russia and the United States should 
work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 
�1st century. We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that per-
petuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. This Treaty 
ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 3� years. 
It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that 
face us, our allies and other countries. That’s why we should work together to 
replace this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break 
from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. This 
new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past.53
The proposed systems architecture that had been the bone of contention in ���1 
was more modest in design than had been its SDI predecessor; nonetheless, con-
siderable technical difficulties and political challenges were involved. The insti-
tutional responsibilities for dealing with this matter had been divided up. The 
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President Bush outlined his foreign-policy goals for the first time in a 
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transition toward democracy and a free-market system. 5� In other speeches, the 
Bush administration had repeatedly spoken about the diminished relevance of 
the existing arms control regimes, and had called for moving beyond the ABM 
Treaty; this had been indicated in several speeches and studies even before the 
administration took office.
NMD AND THE ROLE OF THE ABM TREATy
Over the course of the first nine months of ���1, issues related to strategic 
arms control made up the bulk of the bilateral agenda with Russia. The ABM 
Treaty in its existing format was the main obstacle to the Bush administration 
achieving one of its main campaign promises. To deliver on this, the United 
States needed to start more advanced testing and eventually deploy a national 
missile-defense system (NMD). The issue had been controversial and fiercely 
debated domestically at the start of the 19��s when the ABM Treaty came into 
force. Moot points included the feasibility and effectiveness of such a system and 
the enormous costs of its development. The issue resurfaced during the Reagan 
presidency as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and was used very efficiently 
by the president, who managed to bring Mikhail Gorbachev to the negotiating 
table on additional reductions of nuclear arms in the mid-�s.51 
The new administration’s main argument was that the most urgent threat 
in the post-Cold War era stemmed from a small number of missiles in the hands 
of states like Iran, Iraq and North Korea, collectively termed “rogue states” 
at the time. This threat assessment increased the possibility of an unintended 
missile launch from Russia and stimulated a renewed interest in developing mis-
sile defense. Russia, China and the European allies of the United States were 
negative to the idea; the threat assessment of the activities of the rogue states 
was met with skepticism and there were concerns about the implications mis-
sile defense would have on international stability in general. In a speech at the 
5� President Bush address to State Department personnel, 15th February, ���1. 
Quoted from Frank Csongos, “Bush Outlines Broad Foreign Policy Goals”, 
US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 1�� February ���1 (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty [online �� Mar ����]).
51 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 
�����), pp. ��5–�. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was 
proposed by President Reagan in 19�, and talks on this treaty took place 
sporadically during the 19�s. Although Gorbachev was adamant in his 
opposition to SDI, the issue probably softened his attitudes toward overall 
reductions. A final START treaty was signed in 1991, five months before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
National Defense University in Washington DC, President Bush argued the case 
for developing a national missile-defense system and underlined the importance 
of extensive consultations with other nations as the US prepared to proceed to 
build the system. The first step in this direction would be renegotiating or ab-
rogating the ABM Treaty. Since Russia, as the only other effective party to the 
treaty would be the prime interlocutor on this issue, the speech also contained 
several passages on Russia: 
Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. Its government is no longer Com-
munist. Its president is elected. Today’s Russia is not our enemy, but a country in 
transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation, democratic, at peace 
with itself and its neighbors.5�
It was obvious that the United States needed to engage its major international 
partners and allies in a dialogue on the issue. Speaking of the necessity to consult 
with other states on the development of missile defense, Bush said:
… These will be real consultations. We are not presenting our friends and allies 
with unilateral decisions already made ... Russia and the United States should 
work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 
�1st century. We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that per-
petuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. This Treaty 
ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 3� years. 
It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that 
face us, our allies and other countries. That’s why we should work together to 
replace this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break 
from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. This 
new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past.53
The proposed systems architecture that had been the bone of contention in ���1 
was more modest in design than had been its SDI predecessor; nonetheless, con-
siderable technical difficulties and political challenges were involved. The insti-
tutional responsibilities for dealing with this matter had been divided up. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) controlled the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
and had overall responsibility for development, tests and eventual deployment. 
The Department of State (DoS) had been conducting negotiations with the Rus-
5� George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at the 
National Defense University”, 1 May ���1 (White House [online 14 May 
����]).
53 Ibid.
32 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 3/2008 uS POlIcy tOwarD ruSSIa after 9/11
sians about changing the ABM Treaty since the second term of the Clinton ad-
ministration. The policy of the DoS, focusing on keeping the missile defense 
effort within the confines of a new framework for strategic arms control, report-
edly also reflected the views of Colin Powell himself, a proponent of keeping the 
ABM Treaty in place.54
On the DoD side, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had long been a 
proponent of missile defense, the development of which he had worked on in 
a number of contexts. He favored the US withdrawing from the treaty, a point 
of view that had been prevalent in segments of the Republican Party for several 
decades.55 There were conflicting interests between the DoS, which favored a 
policy of strong engagement and negotiation, and the DoD, which focused on 
the concrete aspects of preparing to deploy a workable system. From the DoD 
perspective, the ABM Treaty was an obstacle to the department’s work to devel-
op a missile-defense system. Some segments of the foreign-policy establishment 
in the United States had been generally opposed to arms-control agreements 
with the Soviet Union and Russia for a long time, mostly because any kind of 
limitation or reduction of nuclear options for the United States in their view 
amounted to a concession to Russia. These conservatives claimed that negotiat-
ing amendments with Russia was tantamount to a Russian veto on the issue, and 
therefore not an advisable course of action.5��
Consultations with Russia on the role of the ABM Treaty took place sev-
eral times during the first half of ���1. Secretary of State Colin Powell met his 
Russian counterpart on several occasions during this period, though no visible 
progress was made. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz met with his 
Russian counterparts for the first round of official talks about missile defense in 
May. President Bush and President Putin met for the first time in Ljubljana on 1�� 
June and established a personal relationship.5� President Putin’s attitude to the 
missile-defense question was cautious and he warned of the dangers of unilateral 
action. Agreement was reached, however, on the need for a US-Russian partner-
ship and closer dialogue in the future. The presidents met again a month later 
on the margins of the G- summit in Genoa. At this second meeting, the agenda 
was centered more on the strategic issues related to missile defense and the ABM 
54 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 314.
55  Ibid., pp. �53, 314. This school of thought was negative to arms control in 
general, and had its intellectual roots in the early 19��s from the debates 
around the negotiation of SALT I and the ABM Treaty. 
5�� Congressional Research Service, “Nuclear Arms Control. The US-Russian 
Agenda”, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, updated 3 October ����, IB 9�3� 
(Washington DC: Library of Congress, ����):1�.
5� Breffni O’Rourke, “Bush-Putin Meeting May Signify New Cooperation”, 
US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 1 June ���1 (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty [online �9 Mar ����]).
Treaty than than had been the case within the somewhat broader context of the 
first. The main result was that future dialogue about the ABM Treaty would be 
linked to a new round of talks concerning reducing the number of strategic mis-
siles. Linking the issues of defensive and offensive systems was considered to fa-
cilitate providing fruitful ground for expanding the scope of future negotiations. 
Both sides had wanted for several years to move to lower numbers of strategic 
weapons, but this goal had proven elusive. President Bush was unclear about 
what he would regard as the preferred end-state of the process, and whether 
framework agreements on both defensive and offensive systems were desirable 
or feasible.5 After the meeting, the tone of the Russian criticism changed, and 
reports also indicated that President Putin was willing to consider changes to 
the ABM Treaty. It seems probable that the initially positive personal dynamic 
between Presidents Bush and Putin created some momentum in the process, 
thereby providing the necessary direction for the process on the Russian side. 
Also, the United States and Russia announced that consultations would start on 
missile defense and strategic nuclear arms reductions.59 
NEGOTIATING THE SORT TREATy
The status of talks on strategic arms reductions in ���1 was connected to de-
velopments that took place under the former administration. During President 
Clinton’s second term (199�–����), the ABM Treaty was high on the bilateral 
agenda, and served to complicate ratification and further negotiation of a future 
START III. The Clinton administration oversaw the ratification of START II in 
199�� after Presidents Bush and Yeltsin had signed it initially in 1993, and it was 
eventually ratified by the Duma early in ����.��� Reaching a new agreement with 
Russia on the further reduction of the number of strategic weapons proved dif-
ficult for the Clinton administration and when it left office, it had not achieved 
any breakthrough on the issue. 
Much of the reason for this was the renewed focus on missile defense and 
the complications this created in negotiating force reductions with Russia. The 
Russian side wanted to cut the number of deployed warheads down to 1,5��, 
but the United States had repeatedly resisted such high reductions. The neces-
5 Ibid.
59 Congressional Research Service, “Russia”, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 
updated �5 September ���1, IB 9��9 (Washington DC: Library of 
Congress, ���1): 14.
��� START II was ratified by the Duma contingent on the United States adhering 
to the ABM treaty. This view was also echoed by President Putin. For details 
on the process, see Congressional Research Service: “Nuclear Arms Control. 
The US …”: ��. This was connected to amendments made to the ABM Treaty 
in 199� that were not submitted to Congress. This made the treaty, legally 
speaking, not binding.
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sary number of warheads stipulated by the DoD was between �,��� and �,5��, 
and the military leadership had rejected any additional reduction. According to 
US officials at the time, cuts to the level preferred by Russia were at this time 
only an option if Russia agreed to modify the limitations of the ABM treaty on 
missile-defense development.��1 When the issues of offensive and defensive capa-
bilities reemerged in July ���1, the United States and Russia had no functioning 
treaty framework in place other than the outdated START I treaty. The Bush 
administration had earlier stated that it wanted to move away from formal arms 
control treaties, and that it wanted to adjust force levels and structure unilater-
ally. From the US perspective, the several rounds of consultations were seen as 
a forum at which to inform Russia of US plans about offensive and defensive 
forces, and to convince Russia to annul the ABM treaty. At the outset, the two 
sides were approaching the issue with relatively different solutions in mind. The 
consultations initially showed few signs of progress,��� but they were not derailed 
by the events of 9/11, which demonstrates the importance of the issue.
The presidents met again on the sidelines of a summit in Shanghai in Oc-
tober ���1. Here, the Russians surprised the Americans with a proposal for 
liberalizing the ABM Treaty’s restrictions in exchange for an agreement to keep 
the treaty alive for another period of two years. The proposed deal stipulated 
that the US could continue to test a potential missile-defense system as long as 
it was not further developed or deployed.��3 President Bush was positive to the 
proposal and “wanted to work out a deal if possible.” However, the Pentagon 
was negative, and moved to thwart the proposal by giving the Russians a special 
briefing on the US missile-defense testing program. The briefing demonstrated 
a “maximalist view” of future testing that included “every conceivable type 
of testing that might be done”.��4 This perspective on testing reduced to almost 
zero the room for compromise, and made it very difficult for the Russian side 
to uphold the proposed deal. Shortly after, when President Putin visited Wash-
ington in November, the chances of reaching an agreement had evaporated, and 
��1 Congressional Research Service, “Nuclear Arms Control. The US …”: �.
��� A high-level meeting between Secretary Rumsfeld and Sergey Ivanov in the 
middle of August did little but repeat earlier positions on the issues. See 
Mark Baker, “Rumsfeld Visit Fails to Bridge Arms Differences”, Newsline, 
14 August ���1 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online �� Mar ����]).
��3 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising. Vladimir Putin’s Russia and    
the End of Revolution (New York: Scribner, ���5), p. 134. This proposal 
was not publicly known at the time, but has later been confirmed by both 
US and Russian officials. It was also hinted at in other reports, see Andrew 
Tully, “Public, Private Statements Conflict on Deal to Amend ABM Treaty”, 
US-Russia Relations Special Reports, � November ���1 (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty [online �� Mar ����]).
��4 Baker and Glasser, Kremlin Rising, p. 134.
President Bush announced that the US would unilaterally reduce the number of 
nuclear weapons in its arsenal: 
Current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today’s strategic realities. I 
have informed President Putin that the United States will reduce our operation-
ally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,��� and �,��� 
over the next decade, a level fully consistent with American security.��5
President Bush also made it clear that the United States would withdraw from 
the ABM treaty by the end of the year.���� President Putin’s public statements 
about the ABM treaty reverted to the stance that “Russia’s view remains un-
changed,”��� after a short spell of public statements indicating flexibility on the 
issue. Although the proposed level of cuts suited the Russian side, there was 
still the matter of codifying and formalizing the agreement into some form of 
legally binding document, which the Russians very much wanted. According to 
several sources, it seems probable that President Bush agreed to start the process 
toward a minimalist version of a formalized agreement after Secretary Powell 
had ensured a muted Russian response to the US withdrawal from the ABM 
treaty when that time came. This was achieved when Powell traveled to Mos-
cow early in December to state formally that the US was to withdraw from the 
treaty. Powell wanted to “show it to President Putin and hoped to coordinate 
the Russian response so the world could see that there was not a crisis.”�� On 13 
December, President Bush officially declared US abrogation of the ABM treaty 
to the Russian side, effective as of 13 June ����. This ended years of futile at-
tempts by the Russians to renegotiate and keep the ABM treaty, but the Russian 
official responses were, as expected, muted. 
Talks on reducing the two countries’ strategic arsenals were resumed in 
January ����. At the negotiations, Russia insisted on the “organic interconnec-
tion” of strategic defensive and offensive weapons, as Russia wanted specific 
assurances that the missile defense system would not undermine its strategic de-
terrent. During intensive negotiations in early ����, the parties were very close 
to reaching an agreement on reductions. Powell said such an agreement “could 
take the form of a treaty or something else.”��9 
��5 Andrew Tully, “Bush and Putin Begin Summit by Pledging Cuts in Nuclear 
Arsenal”, US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 14 November ���1 (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online �4 Mar ����]).
���� Baker and Glasser, Kremlin Rising, p. 135.
��� Andrew Tully, “Bush and Putin Begin Summit …”
�� Baker and Glasser, Kremlin Rising, p. 13��.
��9 Francesca Mereu, “Powell Says Washington and Moscow Close to Deal 
on Arms Cuts”, US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 1� December ���1 
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online �5 Mar ����]).
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Although Russian officials were pleased with the fact that President Bush 
had agreed to work toward a legally binding document, there were plenty of 
disagreements on the content of the agreement. The Russian Foreign Ministry 
said the agreement on nuclear weapons reductions had to be “radical, controlla-
ble and irreversible,” so that the arms cuts would not “remain only on paper.”�� 
The DoD wanted to keep a broad set of options and an upward flexibility for 
handling possible future situations and developments. During the negotiations, 
the US proposed “more detailed exchanges of information, visits to particular 
sites,”and “additional inspections” to enhance confidence and help verify reduc-
tions. However, the two sides were unable to agree on the nature of these trans-
parency measures; whereas Russia favored formally binding measures, the Unit-
ed States wanted a cooperatively oriented regime.�1 One of the sticking points at 
the negotiations that took the most time to solve was the rules for counting the 
number of warheads. Eventually this was solved by using the principle favored 
by the US. The treaty contained, however, the concrete limits on the number of 
warheads Russia had wanted.�� An agreement between the parties in the form of 
a treaty was announced by President Bush on 13 May. President Bush and Presi-
dent Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in Moscow, 
thus ending a lengthy process that had been underway since the late 199�s. 
In short, it is possible to say that the treaty encoded US proposals in con-
tent, and that it mirrored Russia’s desire for a formal document. The text of 
the treaty was very short, did not include any new monitoring or verification 
provisions, and left the transparency issue to be settled at some point in the 
future. �3 Through the SORT treaty, the Bush administration achieved several 
of its strategic objectives by acquiring more flexibility to and fewer restraints 
on its nuclear posture. The relationship between defensive and offensive aspects 
of strategic arms control issues and negotiations have always been closely in-
tertwined, and attaining goals within one area usually implied some degree of 
concession within another. This seemed to be the case also for the Bush admin-
istration in its dealings with the Russians on arms control issues. To reduce the 
political and diplomatic effects of abrogating the ABM Treaty, something tan-
gible had to be given in return to Russia. I think it is fruitful to view the SORT 
�� ”Nuclear Arms Cuts Must Be Irreversible”, Newsline, 1� January ���� 
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online �5 Mar ����]).
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treaty in this light. The Bush administration was positive to the treaty being very 
short, and that it contained few specifics and no detailed method of verification. 
All this implied that the treaty left the United States with considerable freedom 
of action concerning the future structure of the US nuclear arsenal. Ensuring 
flexibility, in addition to maintaining a large stockpile of nuclear warheads in 
storage, meant that the United States was preserving the option of maintaining 
comfortable nuclear superiority in relation to any possible future competitor on 
the nuclear scene. 
From the offensive weapons perspective, the arms control agenda of the 
Bush administration was therefore driven by primacist concerns. However, there 
are also interesting differences in what seemed to be the approaches of the DoS 
and the DoD on this issue, in that the State Department pursued policies that 
sought to alleviate the somewhat more primacist policies of the Pentagon. This 
was demonstrated both in the ABM and the SORT processes. Secretary Powell 
seemed to work at length to keep the ABM treaty functioning by trying to re-
negotiate it, whereas the Pentagon seemed more eager to get rid of any legal 
instruments that limited the policies of the administration. In this regard, the 
SORT negotiations were geared more toward granting concessions to the Rus-
sian side than the ABM process, which was higher on the political agenda of the 
Bush administration. 
NMD DEVELOPMENT DECISION
On 1� December ����, a year after formally abrogating the ABM Treaty, Presi-
dent Bush officially directed the Department of Defense to begin deploying an 
initial set of missile-defense capabilities by ���4–���5. This would serve as 
a starting point for the fielding of improved and expanded capabilities in the 
future. Furthermore, President Bush stated that the United States would begin 
a dialogue with Russia and other key nations to enhance transparency, build 
confidence, and explore areas of potential cooperation involving US missile de-
fense plans. From a bilateral US-Russia perspective, this decision does not seem 
to include Russia as an active party; it is more about assessing the importance 
of Russian attitudes toward the issue, and the impact thereof, if any, on US deci-
sions. The decision to renegotiate or abrogate the ABM treaty lay in the hands 
of US decision-makers, and it is doubtful whether Russian (or other European) 
opinions would matter very much in the final analysis. However, if the United 
States decided on abrogation, it would be preferable to have Russian acquies-
cence rather than public criticism; given the long-standing Russian attitudes on 
the issue, however, outright support was not very likely. Although consultations 
were important diplomatic and public-relations tools, it is hard to imagine that 
consultations would have influenced the United States to choose not to pursue 
missile defense. Given the history of the issue and its saliency to many members 
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in the administration, the key question was really whether the United States 
would manage to dampen overall criticism and gain Russian acquiescence on 
the issue, thereby ensuring public acceptance of the American missile-defense 
plans. 
In this regard, the US policy on strategic nuclear issues constituted an ap-
proach in the vein of what I called the primacists. Although the US sought out 
cooperation with Russia on these matters, Russia had few compatible interests 
or potential gains by agreeing to the US proposals. There is little doubt that the 
US would have proceeded with abrogating the ABM treaty and missile-defense 
deployment plans whether Russia had chosen to go along with it or not. It is 
again interesting to note that the DoS was focusing on the diplomatic negotia-
tion process of trying to bring Russia on board, working in a direction more 
similar to the pragmatist approach. The DoD concerned itself much less with 
securing an agreement with the Russians, and worked more concretely toward 
abrogation of the treaty and securing a decision to develop missile defense. From 
the Russian perspective, it is highly probable that developments within offensive 
strategic weapons systems provided the necessary impetus to criticize less the 
ABM and missile-defense issues. 
However, the US did not give any concessions to Russia by signing the 
SORT treaty, besides agreeing to a legally binding treaty format. The document 
was far too vague and general to limit substantially US offensive capabilities, 
and can therefore not be regarded as having had any significant impact on US 
strategic nuclear policy. Overall, the United States gave little and gained what it 
wanted on these issues, securing a high level of available warheads and the pos-
sibility of developing a working technology for defense against potential missile 
attacks by other states. These were both goals geared toward securing US stra-
tegic primacy in the future. Russia seemed content to be included in the process 
and did not display any particular criticism on the official level. 
US Russia policy after 9/11
As we have seen, the Russia agenda during the Bush administration’s first year 
in office was dominated by arms control issues. Cooperation in other areas was 
not broad, and did not include many issues outside the traditional security area. 
Cooperation with Russia was guided by classical realpolitik, somewhat similar 
to the primacists, but also with elements of pragmatist policies more focused on 
engaging Russia. One clear difference in the US approach during the new millen-
nium was that US policy toward Russia was mainly a function of other issues, 
and not a policy objective in itself. This was vastly different from the 199�s, 
when Russia was one of the top priorities of US foreign policy. 
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The events of 9/11 represented a watershed in US foreign policy that caused 
substantial changes in both approach and content. These changes also had im-
plications for the relationship with Russia. The first wave of effects was largely 
positive, adding to the already productive dynamic of the relationship, whereas 
the second wave had a more detrimental influence overall. 
THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 AND PUTIN’S RESPONSE
President Putin’s responses to the events of 9/11 became powerful factors in fa-
cilitating improved relations between the two countries and Putin was thus able 
to build on the relationship that had started to develop with President Bush over 
the course of their first meetings. Putin’s conciliatory actions opened up possi-
bilities for new areas of cooperation that could prove beneficial to Russia. The 
most important immediate effect of the 9/11 response was that the Chechnya 
issue went from being a central part of the problem in US-Russian relations to 
being part of the solution; the shared threat of domestic terrorism became the 
key factor in facilitating a closer relationship with the United States. 
The events of 9/11 changed the priorities of US foreign and security policy 
overnight. The new priorities, threats and challenges to the United States were 
laid out in the new National Security Strategy (NSS) document, published in 
September ����.�4 The dominant focus of this document was the threat from 
international terrorism, and the entire strategy was formulated with the aim of 
preventing new terrorist attacks. The document blended three elements of for-
eign policy advocated by important actors in the Bush administration. 
First, the focus on terrorism paved the way for increased focus on the 
concept of pre-emptive war and the possibilities for the preventive use of mili-
tary force. Second, the document adopted the self-image of the United States 
as a superpower without any serious competitors and with unrivalled military 
power. Third, the document also stated that the United States would seek to use 
its dominating position to promote democratic values overseas. The strategy 
seemed to signal a revival of Wilsonian idealism, this time linked with the use of 
America’s unprecedented military power.�5 
In the document, the significance of US relations to the other great powers 
was seen through an anti-terror prism, and most of these powers were assumed 
�4 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, ���� (White House [online 5 Feb ����]).
�5 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 3�9.
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to be on the US side in the war on terror.��� This assumption also colored the 
role of Russia. The NSS document took a positive view on developments in 
Russia and argued that a “… consensus about basic principles was slowly tak-
ing shape.”�� It further stated that the United States sought to “use this turn in 
Russian thinking to refocus our relationship on emerging and potential common 
interests and challenges. We are broadening an already extensive cooperation in 
the global war on terrorism.”� Written a year after 9/11, the NSS document re-
flected a belief that the relationship between the United States and Russia stood 
on the verge of a new era with the possibility of expanded cooperation. 
Compared to earlier NSS documents, the ���� version represented a new 
constellation of ideas. Although colored by many of the ideas of Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Cheney, the document was 
largely an initiative of the NSC, and was drafted mainly by Condi Rice, Philip 
Zelikow and Stephen Hadley.�9 The foreign-policy goals of the United States 
that were relevant in a US-Russia perspective after 9/11 can be briefly summa-
rized as follows:� 
To eradicate international terrorist forces through reducing financial and 
weapons flows that support them, strengthening the capacity with allies and 
partners who share this goal and promoting policy change, or as a last resort 
regime change, in states that do not.
Prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through a combina-
tion of strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and coun-
ter-proliferation efforts with allies and partners.
To maintain stable supplies of oil and gas at reasonably stable prices in or-
der to sustain robust economic growth.
To promote and spread democratic values and free markets as a major un-
derpinning of global order and integration.
Prevent the emergence of a peer competitor on the military and security 
front that could challenge US primacy.
��� Svein Melby, et al., Supermaktens begrensning. Perspektiver p�� Bush-  
doktrinens utvikling [The Limitations of the Superpower. Perspectives on 
the development of the Bush-doctrine], IFS Info, no. �� (Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies, �����), p. 1�. The assessments of the NSS ���� 
document have been translated from this study.
�� National Security Council, The National Security Strategy … ����, p. ���.
� Ibid., p. ��.
�9 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 331.
� Adapted from National Security Council, The National Security Strategy 
… ����, and Andrew Kuchins, et al., “US-Russian Relations: The Case 
for an Upgrade”, Carnegie Endowment Report, January ���5 (Carnegie 






Most of these goals had always been of importance in US foreign policy, but 
what really changed after 9/11 was the ordering of the priorities and the impor-
tance of attaining the goals. These changes also affected the importance of and 
focus on Russia as a potential partner. Some of the goals would later also present 
the United States with difficult dilemmas concerning its relationship with Russia 
and the other states of the former Soviet Union in connection with the global 
war on terror.
War on terror
The most important facet of the relationship was the concrete assistance Russia 
provided to the United States when US military forces went to Afghanistan to 
deal with al-Qaeda. Russia helped out by providing intelligence; it also increased 
humanitarian assistance and arms supplies to the Northern Alliance’s campaign 
against the Taliban. Additionally, Russia opened up its airspace for humanitarian 
flights and promised to cooperate on search-and-rescue missions. Military op-
erations in Afghanistan quickly led to bases in Central Asian countries becoming 
an issue. The countries of Central Asia were positive to the idea, and that Rus-
sia seemingly did not try to obstruct US access to air bases in the area removed 
a major obstacle to the US war effort. This was one of the key decisions taken 
by President Putin to assist US operations in Afghanistan. The Russians sought 
out guarantees, however, that these bases were to be temporary and would not 
constitute building blocks for any permanent US presence in the area. 
9/11 did not just mainly affect the practical level of the relationship; it also 
created the psychological effect of binding the United States and Russia closer 
together as allies united against a common threat. For Russia, rapprochement 
with the United States also created positive momentum in relations with other 
Western countries and institutions, and this laid the foundations for a westward 
orientation and foreign-policy pragmatism not seen in Russia since the early 
199�s. The alliance between the United States and Russia in the war on terror 
laid the basis for new areas of cooperation, and a renewed focus on old areas. 
One of these issues was intelligence cooperation, within which there had been 
some degree of contact even during the 199�s. Cooperation on topics related to 
terrorist networks, personnel, financing and WMD technology was obviously 
important to the US, but at the same time these were difficult issues. The US 
and Russian intelligence services had been harsh rivals during the Cold War, 
and there was little previous cooperation to build on. However, after the end of 
the Cold War, cooperation had taken place between the CIA and the Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Military Intelligence Service (GRU), 
and also between the domestic services of the country. In connection with the 
war on terror, GRU Director Valentin Korabelnikov visited Washington DC in 
an effort to enhance intelligence cooperation in February ����. FBI and the Fed-
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laid the basis for new areas of cooperation, and a renewed focus on old areas. 
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some degree of contact even during the 199�s. Cooperation on topics related to 
terrorist networks, personnel, financing and WMD technology was obviously 
important to the US, but at the same time these were difficult issues. The US 
and Russian intelligence services had been harsh rivals during the Cold War, 
and there was little previous cooperation to build on. However, after the end of 
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eral Security Service (FSB) signed an agreement on counterterrorism cooperation 
in ���4. There is little information publicly available on the subject, making it 
difficult to evaluate this area of cooperation. But as one Russian GRU official 
was quoted as saying, “… if we want to achieve real results in this difficult and 
dreadful war, the media must be completely disconnected from our joint work 
with our Western counterparts.”1 Some US officials lauded the cooperative ef-
forts in this field publicly,� and even official statements have mentioned it sev-
eral times. This cooperation seems to have had its most fruitful phase during the 
start of operations in Afghanistan. However, it is difficult to see on what specific 
issues intelligence cooperation could have been fruitful for both parties after 
the US military had taken control of Afghanistan. On most issues high on the 
US agenda, Russia often had diametrically opposed views (e.g. the case of Iraq 
and Iran), which meant that concrete cooperation on exchange of information 
would be of little relevance. 
In the related field of counterproliferation, the issues and sticking points 
were familiar from earlier periods during the 199�s. In the view of the United 
States, cooperation with Russia on non-proliferation issues often proved to be 
difficult. On the one hand, there was a series of multilateral and bilateral efforts 
aimed at controlling, monitoring and limiting the spread of technologies that 
could facilitate the development of weapons of mass destruction. At the same 
time, Russia had links and long-standing ties based on arms sales with several 
countries that the United States termed “states of concern”.3 This seemingly 
dual Russian approach, consisting of a blend of cooperation and a direct conflict 
of interests, was problematic for US counterproliferation efforts. Nonetheless, 
the United States and Russia did have several successful joint projects behind 
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tain an active presence in the region. Working from the point of view that US 
interests should decide Russian foreign policy was not a feasible option on this 
issue.
THE JOINT DECLARATION
The signing of the Joint Declaration in Moscow, May ����, constituted one of 
the definitive high points of the post 9/11 relationship between the United States 
and Russia. The text of the document stated that: 
We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States 
and Russia saw each other as enemies or strategic threats to each other has 
ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security and 
economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help re-
solve regional conflicts.�
The document contained several potential fields of increased cooperation and 
focused on the political and economic sphere, non-proliferation policies and 
a new consultative mechanism on strategic security. In the economic sphere, 
working toward Russian accession to the WTO and repealing the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment were, in addition to increasing energy cooperation, the main items 
on the agenda. If successfully executed, these issues could act as important 
means toward increasing a westward orientation and integration. In the security 
sphere, increasing transparency and cooperation within missile defense issues 
were important. 
The Joint Declaration document held the key to initiating cooperation 
within several areas, but US political willingness to give it real content was not 
particularly strong.9 The most elaborate and sophisticated conceptualization of 
a radically improved US-Russia relationship came from the director of policy 
planning at the DoS, Richard Haass. Haass stated that:
� Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Joint Declaration on a New 
Relationship between the United States and Russia”, �4 May ���� (White 
House [online 3 May ����]).
 The Jackson-Vanik amendment (19�4), named after its major co-sponsors, 
Sen. Henry Jackson (D-WA) and Rep. Charles Vanik (D-OH), denied 
most favored nation trading status to certain countries with non-market 
economies that restricted emigration rights.
9 The success or failure of the Joint Declaration was of course not only left to 
the United States alone, and Russia obviously played a big part in bilateral 
developments. US Russia policy is, however, the focus of this study, and 
would also probably be a more important factor in facilitating cooperation, 
given its international position and available resources.
Indeed, the most important and challenging task at this stage is to define a long-
term positive agenda for the bilateral relationship. It has to be about more than 
eliminating old Cold War threats and fighting terrorism, important as those are. 
The relationship must be based on new opportunities for cooperation.9�
Haass listed energy issues, the economic development of the Russian Far East 
and increased cooperation on Central Asia as concrete possibilities. 
Officials at higher levels in the Bush administration had so far not provided 
any concrete outline of the outcome they sought for US-Russia relations,91 and 
this was not a promising sign as far as Russia’s position on the US foreign-policy 
list of priorities was concerned. The top people at the Pentagon had been more 
critical of Russia. Although they did speak of the change from potential adver-
saries to potential allies, they were not spending their time trying to figure out 
new ways to engage Russia; this was the responsibility of the DoS and the NSC. 
Although the United States welcomed the shift in Russian foreign policy, the US 
itself did not give much thought to developing its own Russia strategy after the 
SORT treaty had been concluded.
Given the weight of the Cold War baggage in the relationship, it was to 
some extent necessary to construct a new relationship. This would have implied 
investing at least some political and bureaucratic resources in engaging Rus-
sia, but not many in the administration had that in mind. Even fewer were in-
clined to prioritize this issue on a busy foreign-policy agenda, particularly when 
the war on terror shifted its focus toward the Middle East, and an invasion of 
Iraq seemed increasingly likely. In addition, the relationship became caught in a 
stream of developments within which the two countries’ interests did not match. 
Many of the traditionally problematic issues and their cumulative effect prob-
ably destroyed much of the positive psychological dynamic that had permeated 
the relationship since 9/11. 
THE IMPACT OF THE IRAq WAR
During the first term of the Bush administration, Iraq was probably the most 
difficult and damaging issue for the US-Russia relationship. The United States 
claimed that Iraq was playing an important role as a supporter of al-Qaeda 
and terrorism in general, in addition to posing a threat to international security 
9� Richard N. Haass, “US-Russian Relations in the Post-Cold War World”, 
Speech given to RAND Business Leaders Forum, 1 June ���� (US 
Department of State [online 4 May ����]). 
91 Robert Legvold, “US-Russian Relations 1� Months After September 11”, 
Aspen Institute Conference Paper, August ���� (Columbia International 
Affairs Online [online �1 Apr ����]: 11, and Rose Gottemoeller, “From 
Summits to Sleepovers”, Moscow Times, 1� June ���� (Carnegie 
Endowment [online �1 Apr ����]).
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due to its continued possession of WMD stockpiles and development programs. 
The United States managed to secure a UN Security Council resolution (1441) 
on enforcing its earlier resolutions on Iraq, thereby giving Iraq a last chance to 
report on and eliminate its WMD arsenal. Whether Iraq was complying with the 
resolution and cooperating with the UN weapons inspection team divided the 
United States and its European partners and allies. Russia shared the rather less 
bleak assessments of Germany, France and other European states regarding the 
threat from Iraq’s purported weapons of mass destruction. 
In attempting to secure a Security Council vote authorizing the use of 
force, Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to Moscow, threatened that “Rus-
sia should carefully weigh the consequences of how it votes.” In his view, Rus-
sia’s leadership faced a clear choice between condoning a US invasion, abstain-
ing from voting, or facing an immediate deterioration in ties with the United 
States. He promised more economic and technological cooperation, and added 
that Russia’s relationship with NATO was beginning to yield positive results 
and could improve additionally. All these projects would be harmed, he said, if 
Russia vetoed a US-backed UN resolution, leaving no doubt that bilateral ties 
would suffer across the board if Moscow chose to go against the United States 
on this issue.9� This, however, was not enough to change the Russian position. 
After this failed attempt to secure a resolution, the United States took the 
matter into its own hands, thus causing the opposition to harden. Russia was 
adamantly opposed to any unilateral US military action in Iraq, and President 
Putin repeatedly argued that an invasion would be a big mistake.93 To Russia, 
the invasion of Iraq clearly demonstrated the unilateralist and primacist tenden-
cies of US foreign policy. Also, the stated desire of the Bush administration to 
bring democracy to post-war Iraq to spark off the transformation of the Middle 
East region rang hollow in Moscow. Certainly, other potential motives for the 
Iraq war sounded more likely, but most importantly, the grounds for believing 
that democratic institutions and values could be exported and find fertile soil 
in a country without anything resembling such traditions seemed overly ambi-
tious and not rooted in any realistic assessment of the most probable post-war 
scenarios. And if democracy was needed in Iraq and Iran, why not in Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia? This factor probably added to other negative assessments of the 
motives and reasons for the Iraq invasion. However, the lack of will to adhere to 
international law, work with institutions and listen to close partners and allies, 
9� Jeremy Bransten, “Moscow Unlikely to Be Swayed by Threat over “No” 
Vote on Iraq”, US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 13 March ���3 (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online �4 Mar ����]).
93 “Putin Says He is Against Removing Hussein from Power”, 9 February ���3, 
US-Russia Relations Special Reports, (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
[online �4 Mar ����]).
made up the most significant grounds for the fierce international opposition to 
the Iraq war, and the deteriorating international image of the United States.
Different perceptions of threats and interests regarding Iraq, and to a lesser 
extent Iran, eventually hampered the “special relationship” between the United 
States and Russia. This was made perfectly clear in the period leading up to the 
US invasion of Iraq in March ���3. To some extent, Russia managed to play a 
more subtle and subdued role in this conflict, and therefore the fallout with the 
US was not as serious as for some of the other actors involved.94 Overall, this 
was the first issue in a longer series of disappointments in the bilateral relation-
ship.
US POLICIES TOWARD THE NIS AND THE NEAR ABROAD95
Many analysts have traditionally seen the policies of the United States and Russia 
concerning the area of the former Soviet Union as characterized by rivalry and 
strategic competition.9�� And up to September ���1, this is a relatively accurate 
description of events. The general rapprochement seemed to indicate a change 
even on this issue, with a seemingly more relaxed Russian attitude toward a US 
presence and policy in the area. How did US policy on this issue develop, and 
what implications did this have for the bilateral relationship? 
US foreign policies with implications for Russia and the US-Russian rela-
tionship in this area are of two main types. Both of these strands of policy are 
rooted in the security sphere and have important geopolitical implications for 
Russia. The first is the policy of the NATO alliance, within which the interests of 
the United States are often decisive for the policies and actions of the organiza-
tion. This is the case also for the main issue in this subchapter, the second round 
of NATO expansion.9� The second type is the indirect geopolitical effects of the 
war on terror in the area of the former Soviet Union. 
To the Russian foreign-policy establishment, these lines of policy were 
linked to another part of US foreign policy, namely the Freedom Agenda. The 
policies concerning US support for democratic movements and regime change in 
the area of the newly independent states will be discussed in the next section. 
94 It was in this situation that the famous, but unattributed, Condi Rice quote 
about “forgiving Russia, ignoring Germany and punishing France” surfaced.
95 Newly Independent States (NIS), Commonwealth of Independents States 
(CIS) and the term “near abroad” have specific meanings in some contexts, 
but will be used here mainly to describe the geographical area of the former 
Soviet Union. Thus, the terms are not intended to have any particular 
political or institutional connotations. 
9�� See for example Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard (New York: 
Basic Books, 199), pp. 3�–5��.
9� The Second post-Cold War round of expansion. Earlier expansion rounds are 
not included in this count. 
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not included in this count. 
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NATO ExPANSION
NATO expansion has always been a sticking point in US-Russia relations, par-
ticularly because Russia sees the United States’ as the dominant actor of the al-
liance. Consequently, NATO policies are often seen as instruments of a broader 
US foreign policy. Before the announcement of the first round of NATO expan-
sion in 199�, the Clinton administration sought to alleviate any negative fallout 
from the expansion process by simultaneously establishing a closer relationship 
with Russia within the NATO institutional architecture.9 Russian opposition to 
NATO expansion in this period was ferocious and widespread in conservative 
and military circles, the general population and the media.99 In its most extreme 
form, the rhetoric took the form of US conspiracies to weaken and encircle 
Russia. According to many analysts, the main goals of the US for expanding 
NATO to the former Warsaw Pact countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, were probably founded more on Wilsonian thinking and on ensuring 
the Western integration of these countries, rather than being developed along 
primacist lines of policy directed against Russia.1�� This did not, however, pre-
vent most of the foreign-policy establishment in Russia from thinking about 
NATO expansion as a threat. Furthermore, some US actors did in fact regard 
the process of NATO expansion as a way of containing Russia. 
No matter what intentions lay behind the decision to expand, one geo-
political side effect would be that NATO would be moving closer to Russia’s 
borders, as a comparison between a geopolitical map of Europe from 199 and 
another one from 15 years later would show. This was no doubt discomforting 
seen from a Russian perspective. This change in geopolitical fortunes since the 
end of the Cold War is further underscored by the fact that most new NATO 
members were formerly close allies of Russia, which adds to the psychological 
dimension of the matter. The security implications of this undoubtedly zero-sum 
situation have caused the Russian political and military elite concerns, although 
of varying gravity at different points in time. 
Relations between Russia and NATO worsened after the air campaign 
against Serbia in 1999, and there were few signs of positive developments 
when President Bush took office in ���1. Members of the Bush administra-
tion’s foreign-policy team had been working in many ways toward NATO ex-
pansion since the mid-199�s. This included participation in the US Committee 
9 This was made by establishing the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 199�, 
giving Russia a presence at NATO HQ in Brussels and a voice on a set of 
issues of common interest.
99 For a detailed outline of Russia-NATO relations during the 199�s, see 
Sullivan, US-Russia Relations, pp. ��–.
1�� Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 15.
on NATO, one of the most important lobby organizations within this area.1�1 
Further NATO expansion was firmly on the foreign-policy agenda of the Bush 
administration, and the process toward the second round of expansion started 
to accelerate in ���1. Public statements on the matter focused on securing the 
freedom of the new European democracies and integrating them into Western 
institutions. US officials stated on several occasions that the expansion was not 
directed toward Russia, and that it posed no military threat. The reactions of 
the Putin administration were significantly more muted than during the first 
round in the mid-199�s, and this was attributed to the general pragmatism and 
westward orientation of President Putin’s foreign policy. Some Russian officials 
described the policy of the Putin regime as “calmly negative”.1�� On other levels, 
the criticism was as fierce as in the previous decade, particularly from conserva-
tive circles in the armed forces and the diplomatic service.
The new US strategy toward Russia was different to that of the Clinton ad-
ministration. Under the Bush administration, handling relations with Russia on 
the question of NATO enlargement was not the focus of US policy, and beyond 
the rhetoric, alleviating Russian concerns was not a high priority. However, at 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s initiative, Russia was invited to closer coop-
eration on an upgraded institutional architecture. Initially, the US foreign-policy 
establishment was split on the issue; closer integration of Russia into NATO was 
an idea that did not accord especially well with the views of Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld, and this was another issue about which the Secretaries of Defense and 
State disagreed. Rumsfeld held the view that Russia was neither relevant nor 
trustworthy, and that integrating Russia more into NATO institutions would 
only undercut the efficiency and cohesion of the alliance. However, Secretary 
of State Powell held the view that Russia should be rewarded for its foreign-
policy pragmatism.1�3 At that point in time, Powell’s argument had considerable 
merit, and it also echoed the position of the White House on the issue. This 
tipped the US position toward Powell’s view, and laid the foundations for an 
approach focused more on engagement with Russia on the matter of expansion. 
This process eventually led to the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council 
1�1 Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley and Richard Perle served on the board of 
this organization. USCN was founded in 199�� by Bruce P. Jackson, a central 
member of the Project for a New American Century.
1�� Breffni O’Rourke, “Not Enemies, Not Yet Allies”, US-Russia Relations 
Special Reports, 1�� August ���4 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 
�� Mar ����].
1�3 Anatol Lieven, “The Secret Policemen’s Ball: The United States, Russia and 
the International Order After September 11”, International Affairs, vol. �, 
no. � (����): 9 and Colin McMahon, “NATO, Russia maneuver as Baltics 
watch”, Chicago Tribune, 3 January ���1 (Center for Defense Information 
[online 1 Feb ����]). 
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(NRC) in May ����, which replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) of the 
199�s. The number of issue areas under the new council increased, although the 
fundamentals of cooperation remained the same as under the PJC. This implied 
an increased Russian presence in Brussels, and that its opinions would be heard 
in the NRC, but it did not have any powers of veto over NATO policy or deci-
sions. 
This policy was largely integrationist, focusing on engaging Russia. How-
ever, the initiative did not come from the US, and there was strong opposition in 
US conservative circles to greater integration of Russia with NATO. Although 
the US did finally settle on supporting a policy of integration, this consisted of a 
mixture of the different schools of thought employed in this study. In the Rus-
sian perspective, the implications of NATO expansion were first and foremost of 
a geopolitical nature. It is hard to argue against the fact that NATO expansion 
had indeed moved the former Cold War alliance closer to Russia’s borders and 
that this, in the final analysis, was a development detrimental to Russian security 
interests.1�4 Even though it was repeatedly underlined that the expansion proc-
esses were not directed against Russia, but instead served to integrate the Central 
European countries and secure their westward orientation, these explanations 
were not mutually exclusive. This created a foundation for Russian criticism and 
fed Russian suspicion of the reasons behind the expansion. Given the amount 
of Cold War attitudes both in the US and Russia, in addition to other elements 
of US foreign policy, this was hardly surprising. The rhetoric coming from the 
prospective NATO members also seemed to point in the direction of a more 
geopolitical and security-motivated reason for seeking membership. All in all, 
it was hard to disconnect the military and security implications from the more 
politically motivated reasons behind expansion. This would suggest a situation 
similar to what I described as the Wilsonian dilemma in a preceding chapter. 
As discussed above, the Wilsonian dilemma is a problem of interpretation, 
in that it can be difficult or outright impossible to be certain of a counterpart’s 
real intentions in terms of Wilsonian or idealist foreign policies. This boils down 
to an issue of rhetoric versus what we might call fundamentals. In this regard 
rhetoric is intangible and easily changed, whereas the fact that NATO was clos-
ing in on Russia could easily have had very tangible effects on security if bases 
were established or hardware deployed closer to Russia. It can be argued that 
intentions deduced from such tangible fundamental issues could be easier to 
take seriously than intentions reflected through rhetoric. The potential of an in-
creased NATO military presence close to Russia’s borders was more significant 
than verbal assurances as to the non-threatening nature of expansion. However, 
1�4 The inclusion of the Baltic countries in NATO would imply the alliance 
bordering onto Russia with less than 15� km to St. Petersburg.
given the Russian reactions to the first round of NATO expansion after the 
Cold War, the attitudes to the second round could hardly have surprised the 
Bush administration. There were of course voices of caution also in Washington 
DC. The architect behind the containment policy of the Cold War era, George 
Kennan, called NATO expansion the most fateful error of American policy in 
the entire post-Cold War era, and Kennan foresaw it leading to a restoration of 
suspicion and hostility and an increase in nationalistic, anti-Western and milita-
ristic tendencies in Russian opinion.1�5 
Although the official responses to NATO expansion were pragmatic and 
muted, Kennan was probably right on a deeper level. No matter what inten-
tions lay behind the expansion, the net effect on Russian security was negative. 
Despite assurances as to the non-threatening nature of the expansion, Russian 
insecurity increased with regard to US strategic intentions. Moreover, by choos-
ing to prioritize support to the new European democracies, the United States 
was also evidently giving relations with Russia a lower priority. In Moscow, 
these two factors could hardly be interpreted as conducive to a strategic partner-
ship with the US.1��� This example of the Wilsonian dilemma demonstrated the 
uncertainty about basic intentions that the policy of NATO expansion created 
in the US-Russia relationship. 
THE WAR ON TERROR: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
The war on international terrorism and military operations in Afghanistan led 
to an increased US military presence on the territory of the former Soviet Union. 
This presence, although it occurred initially with Russian consent, created ten-
sions in US-Russia relations clearly demonstrated by the statements of many 
Russian officials at this time. Sending US military advisers to Georgia in March 
���� clearly exemplifies this. 
This was a response to the deteriorating security situation in the Pankisi 
Gorge, where there had been reports of the increased presence of exiled al-Qaeda 
fighters in addition to Chechen terrorists. The US advisers were to train Geor-
gian law-enforcement agencies to fight terrorism and help prevent destabiliza-
tion of the area. It was reported that several hundred US Special Forces would 
1�5 Richard Lourie, “NATO Expansion May Prove a Fateful Error”, St. 
Petersburg Times, 1� December ����� [online 3 Apr ����].
1��� The official invitation to the Baltic republics was issued in November ����, 
followed by invitations also to Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. All 
these countries formally joined NATO in March ���4. 
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make up the bulk of the military advisers.1�� In response, Igor Ivanov stated that: 
“Regarding the possibility of US soldiers appearing in Georgia, from our point 
of view, this could further aggravate the situation in the region, which is already 
difficult enough. This is our position, and Washington is aware of it.”1�
The United States also established a military presence in Kyrgyzstan to 
support operations in Afghanistan. This was meant to be more solid and long-
term than the presence of advisers in Georgia, and consisted mainly of an air 
base at Manas opened in ���1 to provide support for military operations in 
Afghanistan. In addition, a significant presence in Uzbekistan was established, 
which consisted of the Kharsi-Khanabad facility, housing around 1,�� person-
nel also supporting the war in Afghanistan. US cooperation with Uzbekistan 
had been broad for well over a decade, playing up to Uzbek aspirations to be a 
regional player relatively independent of Russian influence. 
Commenting on these issues, most Russian policy analysts asserted that 
the US was attempting to establish a military foothold in Central Asia, and that 
Russia was being pushed out of its natural sphere of influence in the region. An 
increased US military presence in the area was seen as a direct threat to Russian 
interests. This view was prevalent even at the start of the war on terror, although 
President Putin had a different opinion on the matter at that time. Russian state-
ments often focused on the duration of the US military presence in the area, and 
this was also the subject of meetings between the presidents. 
Dmitri Trenin argues that the fundamental reason for the crumbling of the 
strategic partnership stems from these developments, starting in early ����. 1�9 
At that time, the Kremlin made a series of conciliatory steps towards the White 
House while simultaneously presenting a list of requests. 
The list basically boiled down to a single main point: a demand to give Russia a 
free hand in the countries of the CIS. Not only did the Americans not agree, but 
in ���3 they began to pursue a more active policy in the post-Soviet sphere. In 
that same year, Russian politics underwent a drastic shift in focus: from search-
ing for a model of integration with the West to building its own center of power 
in Eurasia. With that, in the eyes of the Russian leadership, the US went from 
being a potential partner to being a rival.11�
1�� “US Could Send Troops as Anti-terror Advisers”, US-Russia Relations 
Special Reports, �� February ���� (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 
4 Mar ����]).
1� “US Could Send Troops …”.
1�9 Dmitri Trenin, “Moscow’s Washington Tango. Russia Needs a New Strategy 
vis-à-vis the United States”, Kommersant, 15 November ����� (Carnegie 
Endowment [online �� Nov �����]). 
11� Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 5, no. 4 
(�����).
There is little doubt that the US military presence in Central Asia was a 
thorn in Russia’s side. In light of this, President Putin’s initial foreign policy of 
condoning the US presence was doubtless unpopular domestically. It is hard to 
argue that the facilities in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan represented an attempt to 
push Russia out of Central Asia in a geostrategic game. The benefits of having 
these bases to support the war in Afghanistan are far too obvious for that. The 
increased presence in Georgia, however, fits more easily into a perspective more 
along supremacist lines. Since the end of the Cold War, Georgia had worked to-
ward a closer relationship with NATO, the United States and several European 
countries. Regarding Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO, establishing closer 
military cooperation with the US was seen in a more strategic and long-term 
perspective in Moscow. With the second round of NATO expansion, this per-
spective included the image of a more assertive US policy in the region aimed 
at establishing a strategic presence and a more active role for the United States. 
Such a presence would serve to limit Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, 
and create a balance of power favorable to the United States and disadvantage 
Russian attempts to restore its position in the near abroad. In this light, such 
policies would constitute a mild form of containment, and serve political goals 
stemming from a primacist perspective on US-Russia relations. 
THE FREEDOM AGENDA
The Freedom Agenda of the Bush administration was an integral part of the war 
on terror and was viewed as an important way of combating the root causes of 
terrorism. Its primary rationale was laid out in the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) document from ����, but it was also driven by a more general Wilsonian 
impulse to spread democracy and freedom. This made the agenda an important 
aspect of the war on terror that linked in with fundamental currents in US for-
eign policy. In the foreword to the NSS from ���� it is stated that:
... The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits 
of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democ-
racy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The 
events of September 11, ���1, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can 
pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not 
make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, 
and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug 
cartels within their borders.111 
111 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy … ����, p. 4.
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111 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy … ����, p. 4.
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The US national security strategy explicitly sought to expand the circle of de-
velopment by opening societies and building democratic infrastructures. Seen 
together with the other dominating elements of the National Security Strategy, 
this constituted an agenda with the potential for regime transformations global-
ly. Although it became an important part of the rationale for invading Iraq six 
months later and for aspirations toward the more long-term democratic trans-
formation of the Middle East, it also became an important aspect of US policy 
toward some states of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, it constituted 
an indirect part of US Russia policy, as it had implications for the US-Russia 
relationship. 
The Georgian Rose Revolution, a political upheaval toppling President 
Eduard Shevardnadze and replacing him with opposition candidate Mikhail 
Saakashvili after irregularities in the ���3 parliamentary elections, was the first 
case of this type of regime transformation happening in the CIS area. Presi-
dent Saakashvili had vowed to press ahead with radical economic, political and 
anti-corruption reforms to transform Georgia into a successful democracy. This 
project was given strong support from the United States, and this was linked 
to the Bush administration’s policy aims toward the states of the former Soviet 
Union. This policy aimed at strengthening and supporting the sovereignty of 
these states, an approach that clashed with Russian interests in the area. In this 
case, the fact that the Georgian opposition had received financial and logistical 
support via NGOs from the United States made the revolution a very sensi-
tive matter.11� From the Russian perspective it looked like a political upheaval 
induced by the United States resulting in the installation of more pro-Western 
regime.
Though some regimes had not registered the link between the Freedom 
Agenda and the potential for regime transformation, the Russian political elites 
certainly had. In Russia, the Rose Revolution was seen as intimately connected 
to the new strand of US foreign policy, and Russian officials did not flinch from 
pointing out their doubts about the legitimacy of the revolution in Georgia. 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov disputed that the street protests 
had been a real revolution and that they had been facilitated by the “active role 
11� The Kmara movement was instrumental during the Rose revolution. Kmara 
received various forms of support from a variety of US and international 
NGOs during the upheaval. See Graeme Herd, “Colorful Revolutions and 
the CIS: Manufactured Versus ‘Managed’ Democracy?” Problems of Post-
Communism, vol. 5�, no. � (���5), pp. 3–1. 
played by US nongovernmental organizations and governmental officials in the 
political turmoil.”113
The same logic underpinned Russian analyses of the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine the year after, in November ���4. Due to Ukraine’s geopolitical impor-
tance and close ties to Russia, the issues at stake in the contested presidential 
elections were much higher than during the events in Georgia. This made the con-
flict of interest and the rhetoric between the United States and Russia, however 
indirect, fiercer than before. The opposition candidate, Viktor Yuschenko, had 
a pro-Western political platform based on integration with the European Union 
and aspirations to NATO membership. The candidate favored by Russia, Viktor 
Yanukovych, had been accused of election-rigging , and reports of fraud and 
abuse were supposedly not properly investigated. These issues triggered wide-
spread protests that lasted for several weeks, until a new second-round runoff 
could be arranged in late December. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that 
“we cannot accept this result as legitimate because it does not meet international 
standards, and because there has not been an investigation of the numerous and 
credible reports of fraud and abuse.” Powell added that failure to investigate 
the alleged fraud would lead to unspecified “consequences” in bilateral ties with 
Ukraine.114 Again, Russia suspected US support to Ukrainian opposition groups, 
including the student-movement Pora, which played an important part in or-
ganizing the demonstrations during the upheavals. Events culminated with the 
pro-Western candidate Viktor Yuschenko being elected president, but a direct 
effect of this was a deteriorating US-Russia relationship. US support for free and 
fair elections crashed head-on with Russian interests in the near abroad, in an 
even clearer way than before. Suspicions of US manipulation and support for 
the popular movement in Ukraine, again directly related to the Freedom Agen-
da, constituted a threat to one of the most important issues in Russian foreign 
policy, its interest in the states of the former Soviet Union. 
The Freedom Agenda also had a direct impact on US Russia policy, and 
paved the way for a stronger focus on internal developments in Russia itself. 
The culmination of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine coincided with the start 
of President Bush’s second term in office. US criticism of domestic developments 
in Russia had been largely muted during President Bush’s first term, and this 
was particularly true of developments in Chechnya. Internal developments in 
Russia from ���1–���4 show that there were quite a lot of issues that were 
113 Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Russia and the US Played Key Role as Events in 
Georgia, Azerbaijan Unfolded”, US-Russia Relations Special Reports, 11 
December ���3 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online �9 May ����]). 
114 Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Could Crisis Strain US-Russia Ties?” US-Russia 
Relations Special Reports, �5 November ���4 (Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty [online �9 May ����]).
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problematic from a democratic and a human-rights perspective, and repression 
was increasing within several social sectors. The reason for not criticizing Russia 
at this point probably consisted of a wish to have a continuing positive overall 
relationship. Eventually, the Bush administration came under increasing pres-
sure to step up criticism of domestic developments in Russia, and there seemed 
to be a change in US policy early in President Bush’s second term. 
The president’s second Inaugural Address, held on �� January ���5, fo-
cused heavily on the importance of liberty and democracy. It contained sev-
eral points on the importance of spreading these values, and pledged support 
to democratic forces facing oppressive regimes around the world, stating that 
the United States would “... encourage reform in other governments by making 
clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own 
people.”115 At this point in time, criticism of the Russian handling of the situa-
tion in Chechnya also resurfaced.
President Bush’s speech, with its strong focus on supporting democratic 
developments around the world, obviously made it difficult to maintain a policy 
toward Russia that largely ignored negative domestic developments. On other 
levels, there had also been an increasing amount of disappointing developments 
during the last couple of years that made the move to a more critical position 
natural.11�� The Russian actions taken and statements made during the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine were probably one of the stronger factors motivating the 
White House to change its position. A month after the Inaugural Address, on 
the eve of the Bratislava meetings with President Putin, President Bush gave a 
clear message to Russia:
For Russia to make progress as a European nation, the Russian government 
must renew its commitment to democracy and the rule of law. We recognize that 
reform will not happen overnight. We must always remind Russia, however, that 
our alliance stands for a free press, a vital opposition, the sharing of power and 
the rule of law. And the United States and all European countries should place 
democratic reform at the heart of their dialogue with Russia.11�
115 George W. Bush, “Speech at the 55th Inaugural Ceremony”, �� January ���5 
(White House [online 3� May ����]).
11�� The Chechen parliamentary elections and the Duma elections in ���3, 
and the Russian presidential elections in March ���3 were seen by most 
international observers as flawed from a democratic perspective. Increased 
governmental control over formerly independent media also played an 
important role here.
11� “Bush Speech Aims to Repair Trans-Atlantic Ties”, US-Russia Relations 
Special Reports, �1 February ���5 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 
3� May ����]).
This rhetorical change in US policy signified a move towards a more transfor-
mationalist approach to Russia. There had of course been criticism before, but 
mostly through lower levels of the bureaucracy, not from the White House itself. 
This new policy also implied that there had been a slight shift away from the 
pragmatic foreign-policy approach adopted after 9/11 in connection with the al-
liance against terrorism. Later in ���5, talk of democratic backsliding in Russia 
was prevalent at all levels of government. President Bush even called upon other 
leaders to focus more on domestic developments, and follow the US example of 
making the spread of democratic values a cornerstone of their foreign policies. 
The National Security Strategy from ����� also pointed in this direction: “We 
must encourage Russia to respect the values of freedom and democracy at home 
… Recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to demo-
cratic freedoms and institutions.”11
Russia expert Richard Pipes argued strongly against criticizing domestic 
developments and said in an interview that: 
It is not up to the American government to criticize the restrictions on democ-
racy in Russia. I think that is kind of meddling in the internal affairs of an-
other country, and Russians are very sensitive to criticism. That doesn’t mean 
we shouldn’t criticize them, but one should be very careful about what one says 
about what’s going on in Russia.119
Russian sensitivity to criticism and lecturing was thus one important factor here. 
In addition, the Russians were skeptical of the US intentions behind the concrete 
implications of the Freedom Agenda for its own near abroad and for Russia it-
self. US public criticism of Russian internal and external policies peaked in May 
�����, when Vice President Cheney gave a speech in Vilnius: 
America and all of Europe also want to see Russia in the category of healthy, 
vibrant democracies. Yet in Russia today, opponents of reform are seeking to 
reverse the gains of the last decade. In many areas of civil society … the govern-
ment has unfairly and improperly restricted the rights of her people. Other ac-
tions by the Russian government have been counterproductive, and could begin 
to affect relations with other countries. No legitimate interest is served when oil 
and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply manipula-
tion or attempts to monopolize transportation. And no one can justify actions 
11 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America … �����, p. 39.
119 “Richard Pipes Discusses US-Russian Relations”, US-Russia Relations 
Special Reports, �3 May ����� (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 4 
Jun ����]). 
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that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbor, or interfere with demo-
cratic movements.1�� 
This speech, coming from such a central and high-ranking actor in the Bush 
administration, obviously caused great problems in the bilateral relationship. 
Even though Vice President Cheney underlined that “Russia is not fated to be-
come an enemy,”1�1 the speech increased Russian negative attitudes and proved 
that public criticism was not Russia’s preferred way of dialogue. Two days later, 
Cheney went to Kazakhstan and delivered an overall positive message about the 
state of affairs there; this did little to alleiviate Russian irritation over Cheney’s 
speech. From the Russian perspective, this was also another example of the Bush 
administration’s selective approach to the importance of democratization in the 
post-Soviet area.
In the color revolutions, Russia saw, rightly or wrongly, the US as an in-
stigator working toward exchanging relatively pro-Russian regimes with anti-
Russian regimes behind a cloak of democratic elections. No matter what the US 
intentions behind its support to these regime changes were, the Russian analy-
ses clearly suffered under the uncertainty of the basic intentions of the United 
States. This way of thinking has been mentioned as one of the most problematic 
attitudes on the Russian side.1�� 
At the outset of this study, I called this type of uncertainty connected to 
the conduct of idealist foreign policies the Wilsonian dilemma. The same argu-
ment could be used with regard to criticism of the Putin regime itself. Critique 
of the regime’s policies and the alleged US support for democracy, NGOs, civil 
society and political liberties in Russia really only demonstrated the US’ desire to 
remove the incumbent regime and install a more pro-Western regime. However 
faulty these analyses, they point to a problem connected to idealist foreign poli-
cies and the intentions behind them. 
Energy Cooperation – entrenching the relationship?
After the alliance in the war against terrorism, a need was perceived to use the 
positive momentum and transfer it to other areas of cooperation, of which en-
ergy cooperation was regarded as one of the most promising; this was also of 
huge importance both to the US and Russia. Being the world’s largest consumer 
and importer of oil, ensuring the energy security of the United States was high 
on the agenda of the new Bush administration when it took office in January 
1�� Dick Cheney, “Remarks at the ����� Vilnius Conference”, 4 May ����� 
(White House [online 1� Jun ����]).
1�1 Ibid.
1�� Thomas Graham, “The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness”, Russia in 
Global Affairs, no. � (����).
���1. The administration conducted a broad study of US energy policy under 
the auspices of Vice President Dick Cheney in May ���1, and the report recom-
mended new policy directions that also indicated more focus on Russia and the 
NIS states encircling the Caspian Basin.1�3 On the commercial side, American oil 
companies needed to augment existing production with new reserves that they 
were unable to acquire from the Persian Gulf, since investment here was largely 
blocked. Growing shortages of domestically produced natural gas in the United 
States also made Russia an interesting partner.1�4 From the Russian perspective, 
the country’s energy sector needed partners and foreign investment, particularly 
in high-risk exploration and in technologically challenging projects. In an exten-
sive research paper from ���4, this argument was underlined by a claim that it 
was a policy priority for the Russian president to work toward increased energy 
cooperation with the United States, and that this had the potential to become a 
cornerstone for an improved bilateral relationship.1�5
Increasing US-Russian energy cooperation had been attempted earlier, and 
it was high on the agenda of the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission for several 
years during the Clinton administration, though no substantial breakthroughs 
were reached. During the 199�s, several US companies had become a part of 
projects in Russia, but most of these were minor projects in Western Siberia.1��� 
Established in 199��, ExxonMobil’s 3� percent share in and role as operator of 
Sakhalin 1 meant this company was one of the more substantial American com-
mercial presences in Russia.1�� Another substantial project established in the late 
199�s was the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), with Chevron Texaco as the 
largest private shareholder.1� The CPC crude pipeline system, running 1,51� km 
from Tengiz in Western Kazakhstan to the new marine terminal in Novorossiysk 
on the Black Sea in Russia, was the largest operating investment project involv-
ing foreign participation in the entire territory of the former USSR and came 
into operation in October ���1. The US presence in the Russian energy sector 
1�3 National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy, 1�� 
May ���1 (Washington DC: Office of the President, ���1), pp. .1�–.14.
1�4 Edward Chow, “US-Russia Energy Dialogue: Policy, Projects or Photo Op?” 
Foreign Service Journal, vol. �, no. 1�, (���3): 34.
1�5 Martha Brill Olcott, The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy 
(Houston: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, ���4) (Carnegie 
Endowment [online �� May ���]), p. 3.
1��� See appendix for complete overview of US presence in the Russian oil and 
gas sector.
1�� ExxonMobil’s Russian affiliate ExxonNeftegaz holds the 3� % stake, and 
is a signatory to the PSA together with a Japanese company, an Indian 
company and a Rosneft affiliate.
1� Chevron Texaco holds a 15 % interest representing about $ �� million. 
Other shareholders are Transneft (�4 %), Kazakhstan (19 %), Oman (� %), 
Mobil Caspian (�.5 %), Rosneft-Shell (�.5 %) and Lukarco (1�.5 %).
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by ���1 was not large, but US companies controlled important and highly vis-
ible projects. The US-Russian rapprochement after 9/11 created the potential 
for a broadened cooperative economic agenda between the United States and 
Russia. How did this potential play out?
the energy Dialogue: FrameWork For Cooperation
In May ����, during the summit in Moscow where the SORT treaty was signed, 
Presidents Bush and Putin launched a bilateral US-Russian Energy Dialogue to 
facilitate deepened cooperation within the energy sphere. This dialogue set out 
to “strengthen the overall US-Russia relationship, enhance global energy secu-
rity and international strategic stability.”1�9 In this process, an Energy Working 
Group (EWG) was established and the two presidents aimed to attain ambitious 
goals through the energy dialogue, focusing on facilitating commercial coop-
eration, investing in the Russian energy sector and promoting access to world 
markets for Russian energy.13� The first event of this new dialogue was the Com-
mercial Energy Summit held in Houston, Texas, in November ���� at which it 
was agreed to establish a Commercial Energy Dialogue (CED), a forum led by 
the private sector initiated to identify barriers to energy trade and investment.131 
There was significant optimism among the actors involved and both the EWG 
and the CED met extensively in various formats during ����, ���3 and ���4, 
but after this, the frequency of meetings was more sporadic.
On the US side, there were several institutions engaged in the energy dia-
logue. The Department of Energy (DoE) obviously played a central role, but the 
Department of Commerce (DoC) and the Department of State (DoS) were also 
important. Furthermore, the White House had taken a leading role in initiating 
the process, and worked to place energy cooperation on the agenda. This was 
also the main cause of the high public profile of the energy cooperation. The US 
companies were increasingly important at later stages in the process, but it does 
not seem likely that they were the ones most actively seeking the establishment 
of an energy dialogue or lobbying for it at the time of its conception. Most of 
the companies that were interested in doing business in Russia had already es-
tablished projects and a presence there in the early 199�s. The interests of the 
US actors reflected their diversity, ranging from engaging and integrating Russia 
1�9 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “President Bush, President Putin 
Announce New Energy Dialogue”, �4 May ���� (White House [online � 
Oct �����]).
13� The EWG constituted the political and government-to-government part of 
the dialogue, and was created by the US Department of Energy (DoE) and 
the Russian Ministry of Energy.
131 “US Russia Commercial Energy Summit Fact Sheet”, �� September ���� 
(White House [online ��� May ���]).
in Western economic cooperation, to diversifying the supply base of the United 
States and acquiring access for the companies to fresh petroleum resources. 
However, the main part of US policy statements focused on the need for 
reforms of the Russian energy sector to improve the commercial framework 
for US companies doing business in Russia. The need for reforms had implica-
tions for the Russian legal system: unstable contractual laws, tax regimes and 
laws regulating the extraction of subsoil resources had hampered foreign invest-
ments during the 199�s. These problems had in some instances been alleviated 
by the establishment of production-sharing agreements (PSAs), but these had 
to be worked out on a case-by-case basis in complex negotiations, and did not 
provide the overall predictability many government commercial actors wanted. 
Moreover, many Russian legal problems had deeper general roots: corruption, 
a lack of independence within the judicial system and the general business cul-
ture all needed tackling by general legal reform. This was not just important to 
the commercial actors: US government actors were also keen to see this imple-
mented, thereby underpinning a policy that called for a transformation of parts 
of the Russian state and society. The US government was rarely in a position to 
front specific commercial projects, due to the fact that the US companies them-
selves were competing for access to Russian partners and resources. Therefore, 
the creation of stable framework conditions and a transformationalist approach 
became the main priority of US government agencies.
Although the energy dialogue documents had stipulated several goals, a 
more concrete set of potential cooperation issues eventually emerged. One of 
the most central was increasing the volume of oil exported from Russia to the 
United States. Traditionally, Russian oil exports went mainly to Europe by pipe-
lines, and Russian companies did not compete in the US. To be able to supply 
the United States with significant quantities of oil, Russian production would 
have to increase. Furthermore, the location of available petroleum resources 
in Russia was concentrated in the Western parts of Siberia, so developing the 
infrastructure of the port of Murmansk, the only ice-free deep-water port in the 
Northwestern region of Russia, emerged as an alternative for increased exports 
to the US. This would imply the construction of a new pipeline from Western Si-
beria to Murmansk.13� In ����, Russian exports to the United States amounted 
to one percent of total imports, and some Russian executives stated that this 
share could be increased by up to 13 percent if the export infrastructure were ex-
panded.133 Several private Russian companies were supportive of the $1.5 billion 
13� James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University: US-Russia 
Commercial Energy Summit, Baker Institute Study, no. �1 (Houston: James 
A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, ���3), p. 5.
133 Ibid., p. .
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Murmansk project, and it was given considerable attention by US companies 
and government officials. The Yukos company demonstrated the greatest inter-
est in forging ties with the US oil market, and this helped boost the company’s 
positive image in the West. 
The initial meetings also focused on technically difficult projects in the 
frontier areas, such as Sakhalin in the Far East and the Arctic shelf. One of the 
most interesting and complex projects for which international partners had not 
yet been chosen was the gigantic Shtokman field in the northeastern Barents 
Sea; the field quickly became one of the most hyped potential projects of the 
energy dialogue, and attracted considerable interest from American companies. 
Development of it could both diversify US supplies and promote access for US 
companies to the Russian market. Moreover, the structure and domestic role of 
Gazprom were important items on the agenda. Dismantling Gazprom’s monop-
oly in different areas of business was discussed in the various energy dialogue 
formats. 134 Ending its monopoly on gas transportation was especially impor-
tant: the US repeatedly raised this issue.
Although some analysts voiced skepticism of the outlined goals of the en-
ergy dialogue,135 expectations were high. The closing statements of the first CED 
meeting from the Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham, returned to focusing 
on working toward stabilizing and modernizing the commercial framework for 
US companies in Russia: 
To succeed, the US and Russian governments do have an important role to play. 
Our job is to create the framework of laws and rules that will allow our com-
panies to form partnerships with confidence in the security of the arrangements, 
including the sanctity of contracts.13��
His Russian counterpart, Igor Yusufov’s statement, shows quite a different ap-
proach:
… we made a uniform conclusion at the summit that companies from our coun-
tries must work together to resolve this problem of world energy market stabil-
ity by increasing supplies and by participating in joint projects, both in Russia 
and in third-world countries, where knowledge and experience of our specialists 
are out to use [sic]. When the transportation network is established and expand-
ed, Russia will be able to regularly supply oil and oil products to the American 
134 Covering Gazprom’s roles in production, sales and distribution.
135 See for example Fiona Hill and Florence Fee, “Fueling the Future: The 
Prospects for Russian Oil and Gas”, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 1�, no. 3 (����).
13�� James A. Baker III Institute …: US-Russia Commercial Energy Summit, p. 
11.
market. We invite American companies and financial institutions to support im-
plementation of such projects … we await specific proposals for them.13�
These two statements pointed in the direction of different approaches to the 
energy dialogue and to energy cooperation; one focused on transforming the 
Russian energy sector to facilitate increased US investments, while the other 
basically just sought increased direct US investments in Russian energy projects. 
This demonstrates a discrepancy between the two sides’ perceptions of the goals 
of the energy dialogue. The Russian statement indicated a positive attitude to-
ward US participation, although it made little mention of the changes to the 
commercial framework that the US companies felt were necessary to increase 
investments. On the Russian side, there was a clear dividing line between those 
favoring increased foreign participation in the energy sector, and those commer-
cial and political actors who had a more negative attitude:
The opportunities for US companies to invest in Russia are not clear and straight-
forward. Russia has gone through a series of changing attitudes towards western 
investment and its desirability and necessity. When oil prices are relatively low, 
or the Russian economy weak, western investment has been attractive and Rus-
sian policymakers have been active promoters of it. With a more robust Russian 
economy and higher oil prices, Russian policymakers have changed their tune. 
Regulatory, legal, and tax and other fiscal policies reflect this changing environ-
ment.13
The power of the structural reform arguments was stronger during the 199�s 
and in the early years of the new millennium, when the state of affairs in the 
Russian energy sector was more negative and oil prices were low. The often-
used argument about the Russian energy sector needing western investments, 
technology and management skills also lost most of its power and validity after 
the oil price hikes from ���3 onward. The new economic conditions secured the 
Russian state and private energy companies’ fiscal autonomy and the possibility 
to buy the services they needed to develop the sector.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE ENERGy DIALOGUE EFFORTS
Even though the two presidents had decided that commercial cooperation was 
to play the key role in the energy dialogue, the dialogue’s main content seemed 
to consist of policy statements and bureaucratic processes in the Energy Work-
13� Ibid.: 1�.
13 Leonard Coburn, “US Cooperating with Russia, Central Asia on Global 
Energy Security”, 3� April ���3, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (USinfo.state.gov [online � Dec �����]).
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ing Group (EWG), while the Committee for Economic Development (CED) cre-
ated little concrete output in the form of economic cooperation. Reports from 
the first CED in ���� claimed that “while the meeting did not create any deals, 
it did produce several announcements.”139 
Despite repeated US efforts to open up the Russian market to capital in-
vestments from American companies, successes are few and far between. In ad-
dition to the existing projects mentioned earlier in this study, the only really 
significant new one started between US and Russian companies was between 
ConocoPhillips and LUKoil, announced in September ���4.14� It seemed that 
after the initial optimism regarding the possibilities for US direct investments 
in Russian projects, political realities, especially on the Russian side, caught up 
with the energy dialogue. 
Although President Putin’s own writings on the development of the Rus-
sian oil and gas sectors indicated that foreign investments were necessary for the 
strategic development of the sector, he had not specified the level of investments, 
nor their desired country of origin. 141 With the exception of Sakhalin, neither 
the Russian government nor the Russian industry was particularly welcoming to 
direct foreign investment in the oil and gas sectors, in spite of public rhetoric.14� 
The investment of British Petroleum in TNK early in ���3 was one of the few 
exceptions to this.143 
The attention given to diversifying US oil imports in the EWG and in the 
CED can hardly be claimed to have contributed to an increase in US imports 
from Russia early in the new millennium. US petroleum imports from Russia 
stood at roughly ��,��� barrels per day (b/d) in ���� and by ���5, the figure 
amounted to around 41�,��� b/d.144 Despite this relative increase, Russia could 
hardly be said to constitute a vital source of supply for the United States. Total 
139 Michael Lelyveld, “Officials Hail Energy Partnership”, 4 October ����, US-
Russia Relations Special Reports (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 9 
Dec �����]).
14� ConocoPhillips and LUKoil established closer cooperation when the US 
company bought a �.�� % share of LUKoil in a strategic equity alliance. The 
total cost of the initial investments was close to $ � billion, with an option 
to increase Conoco’s stake in LUKoil to �� %. As of March �����, the stake 
had reached 1�.1 %. See “ConocoPhillips buys Lukoil stake”, BBC Business 
News, 3� September ���4 [online ��� May ���]. 
141 See Harley Balzer, “The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy”, Post-
Soviet Affairs, vol. �1, no. 3 (���5) for more information on this subject.
14� Edward Chow, United States Energy Security: Russia and the Caspian, statement 
before the US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 3� April ���3 
(United States Senate [online � Dec �����]).
143 BP paid $ ��.�5 billion to get a 5� % stake in the merger of the petroleum-
related holdings of the Alfa group and Access-Renova. 
144 Energy Information Administration, “International Petroleum (Oil) Imports 
and Exports” [online 11 Dec �����].
petroleum imports to the US in ���5 were on average 13.� million b/d, and the 
increase in imports from Russia was therefore of little significance. For Russian 
exports to have a more significant impact on the US petroleum market, there 
would have to be a substantial increase in overall production, and this would 
have to include bringing new projects and new infrastructure online. During 
the timeframe of this study there have been few signs that this was happening 
beyond rhetoric and the planning stage. 
The US also highly prioritized efforts to reform the Russian economy, legal 
system and the energy sector in general. As I pointed out, there were two main 
approaches to the energy dialogue on the US side. On the one hand, there was 
a focus on getting into and starting up concrete projects with the Russians; on 
the other, there was the more long-term and difficult work of making the case 
to the Russians of implementing reforms in the energy sector. It seems that Rus-
sian attitudes toward this were more positive at the start of the energy dialogue 
than at later stages. Public discussion of the benefits of reforming the two enti-
ties controlling oil infrastructure (Transneft) and gas infrastructure (Gazprom), 
seemed to die out, and had ceased altogether by ���3. If there were genuine 
hopes among US actors of broad-ranging structural reform and an opening up 
of the Russian oil and gas sector, these were extinguished by the political fallout 
and the economic effects of the Yukos case.145 
Of all the developments on energy issues in the period ���1–�����, it is 
hard to find an issue with a more negative effect on the bilateral relationship 
than the Yukos case. The sequence of events demonstrated clearly that the vi-
sions of the United States and Russia with regard to energy cooperation had 
parted ways fundamentally. The increasing levels of state control implied by the 
takeover of Yukos were not a policy conducive to opening up the market to US 
companies. Even worse were the implications for the regulatory framework for 
foreign companies operating in Russia. The renationalization of Yukos, and the 
way in which it was executed by the Russian authorities made it very difficult 
for the US to continue the dialogue on general reforms and was a heavy blow to 
the efforts aimed at this transformation. However, this backlash was probably 
more damaging for the government-to-government contact than for the com-
mercial actors. US companies defied official warnings against entering into new 
projects in Russia. The ConocoPhillips deal with LUKoil mentioned earlier is the 
most evident example of this. Overall, the Yukos case indicated a policy shift on 
145 It would be too daunting a task to try to give even an outline of the events of 
this case. For readers particularly interested in the subject, I can recommend 
Ariel Cohen, “The Khodorkovsky Verdict: A Setback for US-Russian 
Relations”, Heritage Foundation Webmemo, no. �53, � June ���5 [online 
15 Dec �����].
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139 Michael Lelyveld, “Officials Hail Energy Partnership”, 4 October ����, US-
Russia Relations Special Reports (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 9 
Dec �����]).
14� ConocoPhillips and LUKoil established closer cooperation when the US 
company bought a �.�� % share of LUKoil in a strategic equity alliance. The 
total cost of the initial investments was close to $ � billion, with an option 
to increase Conoco’s stake in LUKoil to �� %. As of March �����, the stake 
had reached 1�.1 %. See “ConocoPhillips buys Lukoil stake”, BBC Business 
News, 3� September ���4 [online ��� May ���]. 
141 See Harley Balzer, “The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy”, Post-
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petroleum imports to the US in ���5 were on average 13.� million b/d, and the 
increase in imports from Russia was therefore of little significance. For Russian 
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the other, there was the more long-term and difficult work of making the case 
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145 It would be too daunting a task to try to give even an outline of the events of 
this case. For readers particularly interested in the subject, I can recommend 
Ariel Cohen, “The Khodorkovsky Verdict: A Setback for US-Russian 
Relations”, Heritage Foundation Webmemo, no. �53, � June ���5 [online 
15 Dec �����].
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the Russian side that would constitute a more assertive and statist approach to 
energy issues, and a rebuff of the transformationalist US approach. 
The Murmansk pipeline and the Shtokman LNG project had solidified as 
symbolic projects of the energy dialogue. By the time of the second EWG meet-
ing in September ���3, the possibilities for a Murmansk pipeline seemed dim, 
and conflict between the private companies and Transneft about the project 
had erupted in public. By working against the project, Transneft demonstrated 
its complete lack of will to participate in or condone any kind of infrastruc-
ture project outside the company’s own direct control.14�� The debate about 
the Murmansk pipeline ended with the process against Yukos and Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, which coincided with a government reshuffle that removed some 
of the more outspoken economic liberalists in February ���4. Although the US 
side continued to push for the Murmansk project ahead of the CED meeting 
later that year, it has still to materialize.
The debate about developing the Shtokman field was never as controversial 
as that about the Murmansk project, probably because it was never as concrete. 
Even though the Shtokman project was floated at an early stage of the energy 
dialogue, it took much longer to mature. However, the project was a central 
issue during the second CED meeting in September ���3. The prospect of send-
ing liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the US was said to be a natural marriage of 
interests, while Secretary of Commerce Evans claimed that “Russian gas could 
compete with Canadian and even Mexican gas.”14� Gazprom presented a short-
list of potential partners for cooperation on the project in September ���5, and 
there were two US companies on the list, Chevron Texaco and ConocoPhillips. 
As the selection process dragged out, the US government increased pressure on 
the Russian authorities, and grew increasingly impatient. At the time of the G 
summit in St Petersburg in July �����, no decision had yet been taken about 
foreign participation on Shtokman, even though this was expected. This repre-
sented a serious setback for the energy dialogue and the US companies wanting 
to participate in the project.14
14�� Michael Lelyveld, “Government Seeks Compromise with Big Oil 
Companies”, Newsline, 31 January ���3 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
[online 19 Dec �����]).
14� Sophie Lambroschini, “Summit Focuses on Increasing Energy Exports, 
Especially to US”, US-Russia Relations Special Reports, �4 September ���3 
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online �4 Mar ����]).
14 Gazprom announced Total and StatoilHydro as participants in Shtokman in 
the second half of ����. At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that more 
foreign partners will be included in the project.
ENERGy COOPERATION, POLICy APPROACHES AND GOALS
Looking at the energy dialogue with the power of hindsight, there seemed to be 
good possibilities for increased commercial cooperation up to ����–���3, but 
when the Russian state reasserted its control of the oil sector, these possibilities 
largely disappeared. In addition, the vastly increased profits provided by high 
oil and gas prices reduced the Russian energy sector’s need for foreign capital. 
The serious repercussions of the Yukos case itself were particularly evident at 
a political and diplomatic level. However, it is interesting to note that the larg-
est single private investment deal was made a year after the Yukos case started 
and consisted of substantial US involvement in a privately owned Russian oil 
company. For Russia, energy security was “about the state’s retaking the control 
of the commanding heights of the economy and extending that control down-
stream, over the export pipelines that provided a substantial part of government 
revenues.” Whereas consumer countries were focusing on security of supplies, 
security of demand was the most important factor to Russia. For the United 
States, “energy security meant security from severe supply disruptions, and cre-
ating a semblance of energy independence domestically.” 149
In retrospect, the energy dialogue can be seen largely as a political con-
struct; the role of the White House was important here, and the energy dialogue 
played an important role in underpinning other policies toward Russia; it was 
also a potential showcase for the improved US-Russian relationship. Russia was 
interested in an increased US presence at the start of the energy dialogue process, 
but increased oil prices changed these circumstances fundamentally. The main 
indicator of a successful energy dialogue would be a substantial increase in US 
petroleum imports from Russia. However, as discussed above, the actual import 
levels in the period in question were insignificant and little more than a blip. The 
concrete projects constituting the bulk of the public part of the dialogue, the 
Murmansk pipeline and the Shtokman project, both failed to materialize with-
in the medium term, and the changing conditions for the projects also seemed 
to have made them less interesting to US actors. On a project level, American 
subcontractors and service companies seem to be the most successful, although 
most of them maintain a low public profile in Russia. 
The development of energy cooperation between the United States and 
Russia seemed to guided in part by a number of mechanisms and assessments, 
rather than by the general bilateral relationship. Whereas the presence of Ameri-
can energy companies in Russia can hardly be called broad or deep, it has grown 
persistently in the last 1�� years. Furthermore, the level of activity and the oc-
currence of breakthroughs in energy cooperation do not necessarily seem to be 
149 Daniel Yergin, “What Does ‘Energy Security’ Really Mean?” Wall Street 
Journal, 11 July �����.
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played an important role in underpinning other policies toward Russia; it was 
also a potential showcase for the improved US-Russian relationship. Russia was 
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concrete projects constituting the bulk of the public part of the dialogue, the 
Murmansk pipeline and the Shtokman project, both failed to materialize with-
in the medium term, and the changing conditions for the projects also seemed 
to have made them less interesting to US actors. On a project level, American 
subcontractors and service companies seem to be the most successful, although 
most of them maintain a low public profile in Russia. 
The development of energy cooperation between the United States and 
Russia seemed to guided in part by a number of mechanisms and assessments, 
rather than by the general bilateral relationship. Whereas the presence of Ameri-
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closely connected to developments in the general relationship or the diplomatic 
rhetoric at any time describing the relationship. This indicates that energy coop-
eration, and economic cooperation in general, are guided by criteria other than 
diplomatic relationships and the concomitant evaluations of political develop-
ments. A case in point here is the American energy companies’ continuing inter-
est in participating in new projects in Russia, despite the increasingly gloomy 
official evaluations of the Russian energy sector and the negative trends in the 
bilateral relationship coming from the White House and the State Department. 
The lack of tangible successes stemming from the energy dialogue demonstrates 
first and foremost that it is difficult for governments to do anything but try to 
facilitate cooperation. Identifying potential partners and projects are best taken 
care of by the companies themselves. 
The choice between economic cooperation and integration through 
projects (an integrationist approach) on the one hand, and the efforts directed at 
transforming the legal and economic framework of the Russian energy sector (a 
transformationalist approach) on the other hand, did not seem to be clear to the 
US actors involved, and this was not necessarily a choice that anyone wanted to 
make. Transformational efforts were probably more important in a long-term 
perspective, and concrete projects were highly visible and gave short-term cred-
ibility to the process. The policies directed at transformation suffered a serious 
setback due to the Yukos case which basically negated the policies that the US 
preferred. However, the project approach had few successes to show for itself. 
The main reason for this was the policy change in Russia, which reduced the 
freedom of action of the energy companies. Even though an integrationist policy 
focused on projects was preferable to any general transformation of the sector, 
the main problem for US energy actors was ultimately that there were few Rus-
sian policymakers who actually wanted, or felt they needed, a large US presence 
in what they regarded as “their” energy sector. 
The transformationalist approach was a much more ambitious and difficult 
project than merely focusing on getting US companies into Russia. Nonetheless, 
the US authorities seem to have chosen to continue demanding reforms and 
transformation, having achieved little success with the integrationist approach. 
It is difficult to argue that advising Russia to change its domestic energy poli-
cies produces better results than working with US companies to gain access to 
the Russian market. The policy of lecturing Russian authorities also provokes 
Russian sensitivites, given the Russians’ long-held focus on sovereignty and their 
desire to make their own energy policies without the interference or criticism of 
outsiders. The adherence of the US to a transformationalist approach in the face 
of such challenges is an important source of tension in terms of energy coopera-
tion with Russia. This tension remained unresolved within the timeframe of this 
study, as were the tensions between the integrationist and the transformational-
ist approach to energy cooperation.
Prevalent policy approaches and summary of findings
From the material I have discussed here, it is possible to discern some patterns 
to the prevalence of the different schools of thought that I presented in chapter 
�. The outline of strategic arms-control issues indicated a relatively clear orien-
tation toward the primacist school of thought; the material also indicated that 
there was a difference in approach between the DoS, working along the lines 
of an integrationist approach, and the DoD, approaching the issue in a manner 
similar to the primacists. In the war against international terrorism, there was 
a marked tendency toward a pragmatic US approach to Russia; cooperation 
on issues was sought out where possible. Regarding energy cooperation, which 
had been identified as a new area of cooperation with great potential, the Bush 
administration never really chose between important elements of the transfor-
mationalist or the integrationist approach. From a short-term commercial per-
spective, being allowed to participate in projects was more important than the 
overall transformation of the Russian energy sector, and this was reflected in 
US policy. It proved difficult, however, not to resort to the transformationalist 
approach when the framework conditions for foreign companies deteriorated in 
the aftermath of the Yukos case. However, this approach was far less agreeable 
to the Russian side, and it did little to facilitate access to Russian resources for 
the US companies. Given the fact that US authorities had little leverage over 
Russian energy policy, the transformationalist approach was a rhetorical con-
struct with little practical use or content. 
US policy on NATO enlargement and toward the newly independent states 
in Russia’s near abroad is more difficult to evaluate. From the US perspective, 
this policy was seen more in relation to the former Soviet satellite countries than 
directly related to Russia. This move away from a “Russia first” principle in US 
policy was in itself a problem. Furthermore, the drive for NATO expansion could 
easily be interpreted as a long-term encirclement strategy with the goal of con-
taining Russia and limiting its potential to regain control over its former allies. 
Furthermore, it would also limit the potential of Russia rising to a level at which 
it could compete with the US on a global level. This interpretation would put US 
policy in the primacist school of thought. Ensuring a controlled geopolitical en-
vironment for Russia while anchoring the newly independent states of Eurasia in 
Western institutions was a policy that in fact contained both a primacist policy 
toward Russia while having a Wilsonian rationale for integrating former War-
saw Pact countries. The effect of containing Russia within a framework of an 
enlarged NATO alliance closer to Russia’s own borders was, regardless of how 
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study, as were the tensions between the integrationist and the transformational-
ist approach to energy cooperation.
Prevalent policy approaches and summary of findings
From the material I have discussed here, it is possible to discern some patterns 
to the prevalence of the different schools of thought that I presented in chapter 
�. The outline of strategic arms-control issues indicated a relatively clear orien-
tation toward the primacist school of thought; the material also indicated that 
there was a difference in approach between the DoS, working along the lines 
of an integrationist approach, and the DoD, approaching the issue in a manner 
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spective, being allowed to participate in projects was more important than the 
overall transformation of the Russian energy sector, and this was reflected in 
US policy. It proved difficult, however, not to resort to the transformationalist 
approach when the framework conditions for foreign companies deteriorated in 
the aftermath of the Yukos case. However, this approach was far less agreeable 
to the Russian side, and it did little to facilitate access to Russian resources for 
the US companies. Given the fact that US authorities had little leverage over 
Russian energy policy, the transformationalist approach was a rhetorical con-
struct with little practical use or content. 
US policy on NATO enlargement and toward the newly independent states 
in Russia’s near abroad is more difficult to evaluate. From the US perspective, 
this policy was seen more in relation to the former Soviet satellite countries than 
directly related to Russia. This move away from a “Russia first” principle in US 
policy was in itself a problem. Furthermore, the drive for NATO expansion could 
easily be interpreted as a long-term encirclement strategy with the goal of con-
taining Russia and limiting its potential to regain control over its former allies. 
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US policy was interpreted, a very real negative effect on Russia’s geopolitical 
situation. Much of the same dual effect was present with regard to the Freedom 
Agenda. It could hardly be argued that working toward democratization in the 
post-Soviet space was a negative policy, but when this democratization implied 
several regime changes that led to these states having a more Western orientated 
direction, it was difficult to see the benefits for Russia in this. 
The proclaimed new partnership between the United States and Russia had 
a great potential to serve the interests of both countries. However, given the 
asymmetry in power and influence that lay at the foundation of the relationship, 
a successful partnership meant Russia entering the relationship as a junior part-
ner to the United States. This might have been feasible in ���1, but as Russia’s 
economic power grew with the rise in oil prices, so did Russian assertiveness, 
and being a junior partner of the US was a less tempting option in ���4 than 
it had been a couple of years earlier. In addition to the effects that economic 
revitalization had on the freedom of action in Russian foreign policy, it also 
coincided with the continued focus by the US on a selection of states in the CIS 
area, a focus that had lasted since the breakup of the Soviet Union, but had been 
renewed and revitalized with the war on terror.
Some of the problems that plagued the execution of US Russia policy were 
of a bureaucratic nature. Even though both the DoS and the NSC were supposed 
to have a coordinating role in the elaboration of foreign policy, the interests of 
the other departments often proved difficult to influence and integrate. This was 
the case with the energy dialogue, within which DoE had a leading role, and es-
pecially with strategic nuclear issues, where the Pentagon largely dictated policy. 
On other types of issues there were several different Russia policies that were 
directed by separate bureaucratic and political forces, and these were not prop-
erly coordinated. This lack of coordination led to policy inconsistencies that in 
turn created problematic policies. The problem of coordination was exacerbated 
by the fact that there was no consistent focus on Russia at the White House. To 
some extent, Russia had an important place on the political agenda during the 
first years of the Bush administration. These positive developments culminated 
with the signing of the Joint Declaration in ����. As the war on terror spread 
beyond Afghanistan, and its geographical impact widened, the administration 
had little time or resources to focus on other issues. The war on terror became 
an all-encompassing issue that eventually bogged down the top decision-making 
levels of the Bush administration. The increased geographical scope of the war 
on terror also put US foreign policy at odds with vital Russian interests in the 
area of the former Soviet Union.
There were also important differences between the first and the second 
term of the Bush administration. During the first, there was less emphasis on 
the need for transformation of the political and economic system in Russia; in 
the eyes of some observers, the administration’s policy seemed to be integration 
without transformation. This was also seen as an important precondition for the 
improved bilateral relationship, at least from the Russian perspective.15� How-
ever, the absence of a transformationalist agenda was more important than the 
integrationist tendencies, which Moscow regarded as shallow and insignificant 
compared to what was viewed as Russian concessions to the US in the war on 
terror. 
During President Bush’s second term, however, the US approach changed. 
The centrality of the Freedom Agenda led to a heightened preoccupation with 
democratization, also in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. 
This created a pressure within the United States to focus more on regime change 
and on the need for domestic transformation in Russia. At the same time, the 
negative developments in Russia’s relations with Georgia and Ukraine made the 
case for reforms in Russia even stronger in the eyes of many observers in Wash-
ington DC. After 9/11 and especially during the second term of President Bush, 
there was no longer any real or useful distinction between idealism and realism. 
Democracy crusading now served the purpose of national security, as had been 
stipulated in the National Security Strategy document. 
Concerning US policy on security issues, the overall trend leans toward 
a primacist approach to Russia. A majority of the issues on which the US and 
Russia had competing interests were resolved in a way that little emphasized 
compromises. It is of course the privilege of all sovereign states to take foreign-
policy decisions to maximize their own interests, but it should hardly come as 
a surprise that such policies can adversely affect a bilateral relationship. This 
demonstrates how difficult it can be to pursue and strengthen cooperation when 
important security interests are at stake. In most cases it is evident that hard 
security interests are more important than other concerns.
15� Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 3��.
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and being a junior partner of the US was a less tempting option in ���4 than 
it had been a couple of years earlier. In addition to the effects that economic 
revitalization had on the freedom of action in Russian foreign policy, it also 
coincided with the continued focus by the US on a selection of states in the CIS 
area, a focus that had lasted since the breakup of the Soviet Union, but had been 
renewed and revitalized with the war on terror.
Some of the problems that plagued the execution of US Russia policy were 
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ington DC. After 9/11 and especially during the second term of President Bush, 
there was no longer any real or useful distinction between idealism and realism. 
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demonstrates how difficult it can be to pursue and strengthen cooperation when 
important security interests are at stake. In most cases it is evident that hard 
security interests are more important than other concerns.
15� Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 3��.
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RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF US POLICy
Although the topic of this study is US Russia policy, it is important to discuss 
some of the Russian side’s thoughts. I shall thus now move on to include some 
important factors that form the Russian worldview and contribute to shaping 
Russian perceptions of the United States and the US-Russia relationship. To 
illuminate the way in which the Russians view international relations and the 
United States as an actor in the international system, I shall present a list of at-
titudes and perceptions that functions as a “filter” when the Russian political 
elite thinks about foreign policy.151 As I mentioned in the introduction, there is 
a tendency in the United States to see the sources of Russian foreign policy as a 
function of the character of its domestic regime, implying that democratization 
would change the direction of Russian foreign policy. That view is not neces-
sarily incorrect, but it isolates Russia as a factor in itself, and does not take into 
account how the policies of other actors influence Russian policies and posi-
tions. The perspective taken in this outline focuses on how policies of outside 
actors influence Russia, and primarily views Russian foreign policy as reactions 
to American foreign policy. 
Russian interests and perceptions
First, and most importantly, Russia wants to be a key actor in international rela-
tions. Therefore, it is important for the Russians to perceive that they are being 
respected and treated as equals when dealing with the United States; this elevates 
Russia’s own standing in the world, and provides legitimacy to the regime do-
mestically. The mechanism may also work in the opposite direction; there is a 
tendency for the Russians to take obstructive positions and launch countermeas-
ures on any kind of issue or development that does not give them a say or a place 
at the main negotiating table in international institutions.
Second, the Cold War is over. The collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, and the demise of Soviet communism eliminated the funda-
mental building blocks of the Cold War international system. This accelerated 
the erosion of bipolarity and reshuffled the relative standing of the various di-
mensions of power. The economic dimension, which was truly multipolar with 
151 Many of these points have been discussed in and come from other research. 
See Graham, “US-Russia Relations” for points 1-5, and Leon Aron, “The 
United States and Russia: Ideologies, Policies and Relations”, American 
Enterprise Institute Russian Outlook, �9 June �����, and Kuchins et al, 
“US-Russian Relations: The Case for an Upgrade” for more background and 
thoughts on this subject.
the United States, several European states, and Japan acting as centers of power, 
rose in importance, as the bipolar strategic nuclear dimension declined. Even 
the bipolarity of the strategic nuclear equation was attenuated as the US and 
Russian arsenals were reduced and nuclear-weapons capabilities were developed 
by, and proliferated to other states. As is the rule in history, however, percep-
tions lagged behind reality and practice behind perceptions. Though the US and 
Russia talked of the post-Cold War, they both continued to operate within its 
conceptual framework. Well into the 199�s both countries viewed the world 
through the prism of relations with one another, and there was a sense that the 
US-Russian relationship would play a decisive role in shaping the post-Cold War 
world. That view, however, was predicated on the assumption that Russia would 
swiftly begin to recover from the multiple ills of its Soviet inheritance, even 
though it was clear that full recovery was a matter of years or decades. That, of 
course, did not happen.15� 
Third, Russia is in many respects a backward-looking power. Acutely 
aware of its own weakness, Russia wants to delay the consolidation of a new 
international system until it has greater capacity to shape it. It also seeks to slow 
changes that would further erode its standing in the world. This is one reason 
for its adamant opposition to any form of national missile defense, no matter 
how limited, and insistence on maintaining arms-control treaties as the frame-
work for strategic issues. Nuclear parity is its last remaining attribute of great-
power status. Therefore, acting to restrict the exercising of US power and limit 
its superiority is important, as this is thought to reduce the asymmetry between 
the countries. 
Fourth, Russian policymakers view foreign-policy actions through a geo-
political prism. Their focus on geopolitics is important as a factor when analyz-
ing Russia’s own foreign policies, but it is also so ingrained in Russian political 
culture that it largely precludes any notion of political idealism in Russian for-
eign policy. 
Russian leaders continue to operate with a zero-sum, 19th century geopo-
litical or Cold War mindset, insisting that Russia is a major pole (even if they 
harbor deep doubts on that score). President Putin spent the first years of his 
time in the Kremlin seeking to create strategic partnerships capable of eroding 
America’s preponderance, or to divide Europe from the United States. While he 
has underscored the need to rebuild Russia’s economy, he has moved aggres-
sively to sell Russian weaponry abroad, in part because this helps maintain Rus-
sia’s military capabilities.”153 
15� Graham, “US-Russia Relations”: �.
153 Ibid.: 4.
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This focus on geopolitics obviously extends into the realms of military and 
security policy, which are of primary importance. The factors of military deploy-
ment and the potential projection of military power are essential in this world-
view. For Russia, what happens in the security sphere usually takes precedence 
over other international developments, a view that has been especially prevalent 
when reading the geopolitical map of Eurasia and its development since the end 
of the Cold War. The geopolitical and security-focused understanding of foreign 
policy has created and maintained several of Russia’s main problems and griev-
ances toward the United States during the 199�s. It is of course in relation to this 
factor that Russian resistance to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and states 
of the former Soviet Union must be seen. US policies toward the CIS area, where 
Russia sees itself as a primary actor with special rights and responsibilities, also 
play strongly into this equation. From the Russian perspective, few factors will 
weigh more in the analysis of foreign policy than these, and there is a tendency 
for these to trump other concerns and actions, making other issues less impor-
tant and relevant. 
Fifth, Russia continues to act as if the United States viewed the world 
through the prism of its relations with Russia. Russian elites have yet to recon-
cile themselves to the fact that much of US policy treats Russia at best as a sec-
ondary consideration. This is true even of the security realm, where Russia still 
has more weight than any other actor. Russian leaders insist that the national 
missile defense is directed against them. The reality is that the United States’ first 
concern is so-called rogue states – North Korea, Iran, and Iraq – with accidental 
launches from Russia, resulting from the deterioration of Russian command and 
control systems, a lesser concern. NATO enlargement is focused first of all on 
promoting democratic development in Central and Eastern Europe, bolstering 
security, and maintaining the United States’ position in Europe; it is not directed 
against Russia. Multiple pipeline routes from the Caspian are about energy se-
curity; they are not aimed first of all at undermining Russia’s presence in the 
region.154 But this mode of foreign-policy analysis that places Russia front and 
center of US foreign policy has detrimental and negative side effects. Since US 
policies are seen to have directly negative effects on Russia, they serve as justifi-
cation for the view that US policies attempt to undermine, encircle and weaken 
Russia. This psychological filter has, together with the geopolitical analytical 
mindset discussed above, worked to perpetuate a Russian suspicion of US inten-
tions, policies and actions in Eastern Europe and the CIS area. 
 Sixth, there has been a huge and growing asymmetry between Russia and 
the United States in power, wealth, attitude and perceptions for a considerable 
period of time. This asymmetry has precluded a wide-ranging, substantive rela-
154 Ibid.
tionship of equals, corrupted communication, and fueled suspicions.155 Howev-
er, since President Putin was reelected in ���4, this asymmetry has been reduced. 
The growth of the Russian economy and increased state revenues from the en-
ergy sector have in some respects reversed important aspects of this trend, and 
this has also increased Russian self-confidence on the world stage. Putin’s Russia 
is awash with oil money, and this, coupled with Russia’s new image and role as 
an energy superpower, have made possible a re-entry on the world stage of pow-
erful nations, the main achievement of the Putin regime. 15�� The reduced asym-
metry and strengthening of Russia has probably made the relationship with the 
United States more problematic, not less. In Russia’s own view, its new wealth 
and more prominent position entitle it to more respect and a more central role, 
a view not always supported by the United States. 
Seventh, Russia often accuses the United States of applying double stand-
ards in its judgments and assessments of different states.15� Russian domestic 
and foreign policies seem to be judged by tougher standards than those of other 
countries, making Russia a target singled out for US criticism. The view that 
Russia is being judged more harshly than other states in the former Soviet Union 
on the development of democracy and the degree of authoritarianism is one ex-
ample of this line of thinking. Making this point not only weakens the grounds 
for criticism, but it also opens up for the argument that concerns about the lack 
of democratic development in Russia are caused by other intentions than the 
merely idealistic. The Russian political establishment in general finds it difficult 
to trust the United States, and it also views the basic intentions of the United 
States toward Russia negatively. These two factors increase the negative impact 
of US double standards.
Eight, Russia is strongly nationalistic. This does not only involve portray-
ing Russia as a patriotic country, but also portends a deeply held conviction that 
Russia has the right to decide for itself how to govern and along which path it 
chooses to develop its political institutions, society and economy: in short, this 
means ensuring sovereignty and political autonomy. National pride and the sta-
tus of Russia as a great power also play a role here. Nationalism of this kind also 
has implications for the way in which Russia defines its national interests and its 
relations to other states. Even though Russian leaders did talk of a partnership 
with the United States for some time after 9/11, this never implied ceasing to fol-
155 Ibid.: 5.
15�� The basis for Russia’s oil wealth and resurgence, i.e. mainly high oil prices, is 
regarded by many observers to be shallow and of a passing nature. The real 
question is how the Russian elites themselves view the solidity of their recent 
upswing in status.
15� See for example Stephen Hanson, “On Double Standards. Toward Strategic 
Liberalism in US Russia Policy”, PONARS Policy Memo, no. 3�� (���5).
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low Russian interests in China or Iran or ceasing to engage diplomatically with 
states of concern unacceptable to the US. Despite such policies causing tensions 
in relations with the United States. Russia is determined to play its role in in-
ternational relations as an independent actor, seeking to develop a position that 
is not bound to the policies of other actors, unless this serves Russian national 
interests. This is a condition for partnership that is not commonly accepted in 
the US. 
Specific Russian interests in the period 2001–2006
According to Lilia Shevtsova, during the ���� election campaign the consensus 
in the Kremlin was to prefer a Republican as the next US president;15 this was 
based partly on earlier Russian experiences with American presidents. There 
seemed to be a belief that relations were better and more stable under Repub-
lican presidencies than under Democratic ones. The Republicans had less of 
a tradition to interfere with the domestic affairs of other countries, and were 
more likely to engage in traditional security issues where Russia still counted. 
The Democrats, however, had often seemed more preoccupied with promoting 
democracy and human rights, on which the Putin administration preferred not 
to be lectured. This would roughly translate into a Russian preference for the 
integrationist approach over the transformationalist approach. The transforma-
tionalist approach would more likely involve US efforts to change the domestic 
regime through US foreign policy. On the other hand, proponents of the integra-
tionist approach would work more directly toward engaging Russia on several 
sets of issues, without having democratic or economic reforms implied as pre-
conditions or goals for cooperation. Favoring the integrationist approach could 
also give Russia the possibility to reap the benefits of increased cooperation, 
such as direct foreign investment in its energy sector, without necessarily having 
to implement reforms. There would also be a US policy of non-interference in 
domestic affairs, thereby satisfying the important Russian goal of sovereignty 
and political autonomy. The integrationist approach would from a Russian per-
spective therefore be seen as the easiest way to more cooperation.
Regarding the other two approaches, those of the pragmatists and the pri-
macists, it would be relatively easy to predict the Russian political elite’s pref-
erence. The main view of the pragmatist approach is that achieving concrete 
results through cooperation on selected issues would be preferable. This line of 
thinking would not imply preconditions other than a commonality of interests 
as a basis for cooperation. However, the primacists’ approach would be the least 
preferable one to deal with; their agenda of ensuring US dominance and he-
15 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, pp. 154–55.
gemony leaves little room for pursuing important Russian foreign-policy goals 
and some aspects of this approach would make it difficult for Russia to play a 
vital role in the CIS area. This logic follows from some of the perceptions listed 
above that are often seen as efforts directed at undermining Russia’s interna-
tional position and status. Other aspects of the primacist approach that favor 
freeing US foreign policy from international constraints and a unilateralist US 
foreign policy would counter Russian desires to contain and limit US freedom of 
action. The Russian foreign-policy establishment’s concerns about US unilater-
alism are among the more serious, because US unilateral actions, especially mili-
tary ones, could cause regional instability and other unintended consequences in 
states geographically close, for instance, to “states of concern”. From a Russian 
perspective, the United States would probably not be interested in protecting 
anybody from the fallout of such actions. Destabilization in neighboring regions 
would impact negatively on Russia’s own security, especially during periods of 
relative weakness.
THE ALLIANCE IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
The alliance between the United States and Russia in the war against terrorism 
after 9/11 was a promising start for a future strategic partnership. From the 
perspective of the Russian foreign-policy elite, this promising start came as the 
answer to a series of conciliatory measures from Russia. Cooperation and con-
sultations with the United States enhance the status and prestige of Russia, but 
this presupposes a certain degree of US political will to come up with something 
deliverable in return. From the Russian perspective, cooperating with the United 
States in the war on terror has yielded few rewards. Russian authorities have 
complained of a lack of reciprocity after conceding to several US wishes and 
demands. The largely unilateralist approach of the US to preparing and starting 
the war in Iraq seems to have proved their point. A similar argument can be used 
about Russian policy toward Iran. The US attitude toward this relationship did 
not change in any way after the anti-terror alliance with Russia, and US criticism 
has continued with few efforts to understand Russian positions on the matter. 
In a situation involving expectations of some kind of breakthrough or a new 
relationship, there are also ample grounds for disappointment. 
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gemony leaves little room for pursuing important Russian foreign-policy goals 
and some aspects of this approach would make it difficult for Russia to play a 
vital role in the CIS area. This logic follows from some of the perceptions listed 
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perspective, the United States would probably not be interested in protecting 
anybody from the fallout of such actions. Destabilization in neighboring regions 
would impact negatively on Russia’s own security, especially during periods of 
relative weakness.
THE ALLIANCE IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
The alliance between the United States and Russia in the war against terrorism 
after 9/11 was a promising start for a future strategic partnership. From the 
perspective of the Russian foreign-policy elite, this promising start came as the 
answer to a series of conciliatory measures from Russia. Cooperation and con-
sultations with the United States enhance the status and prestige of Russia, but 
this presupposes a certain degree of US political will to come up with something 
deliverable in return. From the Russian perspective, cooperating with the United 
States in the war on terror has yielded few rewards. Russian authorities have 
complained of a lack of reciprocity after conceding to several US wishes and 
demands. The largely unilateralist approach of the US to preparing and starting 
the war in Iraq seems to have proved their point. A similar argument can be used 
about Russian policy toward Iran. The US attitude toward this relationship did 
not change in any way after the anti-terror alliance with Russia, and US criticism 
has continued with few efforts to understand Russian positions on the matter. 
In a situation involving expectations of some kind of breakthrough or a new 
relationship, there are also ample grounds for disappointment. 
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US POLICIES TOWARD THE CIS 
Apart from from Iraq, where Moscow had to relinquish most of its influence, 
Washington also made itself felt even closer to home, appearing to frustrate 
Moscow’s diplomacy in the CIS. Russia traditionally sees itself as an economic 
and political centre of gravity in Eurasia, and especially in the area of the former 
Soviet Union. Securing Russia’s special role in this area is one of the highest 
priorities of Russian foreign policy, possibly the main foreign-policy priority 
of Russia today. Russia likely expected some understanding for this from the 
United States, particularly after Russian assistance in the war against terror in 
the aftermath of 9/11. However, instead of more sensitivity for Russia’s special 
interests in the post-Soviet territory, Moscow saw these interests neglected or 
challenged by the anti-establishment color revolutions. The US efforts aimed 
at supporting democratic movements and popular mobilization were seen as 
attempts at regime transformation in the CIS area. The color revolutions were 
also perceived as directed against Russia and at reducing Russia’s role as the pre-
dominant actor in the area. They were also seen as inspired, if not orchestrated, 
by the United States.159
The second round of NATO enlargement including the Baltic States was 
also regarded as an undue expansion of US interests on the territory surround-
ing Russia. This attitude was even stronger when it came to military bases and 
installations in this area. From a Russian perspective, the discussion of estab-
lishing bases in Central and Eastern Europe increased the uncertainty of what 
kind of intentions lay at the core of the expanding NATO alliance.1��� Some US 
analysts even claimed that these new sets of policies served as a signal to Russia 
that Central Asia now constituted a significant sphere of US influence.1��1 The 
Kremlin’s irritation at American policies in the area of the former Soviet Union 
touches on all facets of the relationship. This area is of particular importance to 
Russia, and Russia’s main geopolitical area of interest. If there at any point in 
time was a possibility for a strategic partnership between Russia and the United 
States, this possibility started to wane as US geopolitical interests and presence 
in the area took precedence over having a productive relationship with Russia. 
Partnership and reciprocity
By strongly supporting US President George Bush in the wake of 9/11 and offer-
ing his backing to America’s war on terrorism, President Putin had hoped for a 
159 Aron, “The United States and Russia”: ��.
1��� Andrew Tully, “What is Strategy for Bases in Former Soviet Bloc?” US-
Russia Relations Special Reports, � December ���5 (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty [online 9 Jun ����]).
1��1 Ibid.: �.
new level of bilateral cooperation that would offer financial, military, and geo-
political dividends. This change of foreign policy on Putin’s side did not emerge 
without political costs in Moscow. The criticism of President Putin’s US policy 
was not necessarily founded on anti-Americanism or hostility. A broadish por-
tion of the political elite lent at best tepid support to the rapprochement with the 
United States, “unpersuaded that the US meant to reciprocate or unimpressed by 
the bargains that Putin had struck to this point.”1���
Already in late ���1, there were voices in Russia claiming that president 
Putin had made too many concessions to the United States without getting any-
thing in return. This situation had a historical parallel in the criticism of then 
President Yeltsin in the early 199�s. At this point many Russians expected a new 
Marshall plan or something of that kind in return for what they saw as consider-
able concessions to the West in voluntarily and peacefully dismantling the Soviet 
empire. Instead, Russia saw a US administration determined to pursue its own 
interests on all fronts, eagerly utilizing its economic and military advantage at 
every opportunity. A security analyst at RAND in Europe put it this way: 
On the Russian side, I think there is definitely a sense of almost betrayal. There 
was a hope that a strategic partnership would be established. And in fact, what 
they have seen is a much tougher American position that, from their point of 
view, goes straight against their own interest.1��3 
On the military front, Russia regarded America’s planned troop reorganization 
in Europe, which could see the opening of US bases in Poland and even further 
east, as another example of US high-handedness. 
A lot of changes, of course, are afoot in American military posture that have 
nothing to do with Russia, but are still perceived in Russia as being a direct 
threat to it. Now, here again, the Russians thought that they had an implicit 
promise by NATO and by the United States that none of this would happen, that 
no significant military presence would move eastwards.1��4
Important groups operating within the Kremlin still see the United States and 
their NATO allies as representing an external threat that actively undermines 
1��� Legvold, “US-Russian Relations …”: 1�.
1��3 Jeremy Bransten, “Powell’s Trip to Address Growing Rifts in US-Russia 
Relations”, US-Russia Relations Special Reports, �3 January ���4 (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty [online 1� Jun ����]).
1��4 Ibid.
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Russia’s sovereignty and ultimately would like to force the collapse of the Rus-
sian state.1��5 
In this perspective, attempts at regime change from the outside are seen as 
a possibility. This idea and the fear of outside intervention grew stronger after 
���4, when the several color revolutions took place in Russia’s near abroad. 
Some Russian officials saw external enemies “as working in Russia through a 
fifth column of pseudo-liberals and Nazis” who shared “a common hatred of 
Putin’s Russia.”1���� The ultimate Russian fear is military intervention somewhere 
in the area of the former Soviet Union, or the worst-case scenario, in Russia 
itself. 
As the war on terror progressed, the geopolitical map of Eurasia changed. 
Areas that formerly lay within the Russian sphere of interest drew increased 
attention, and in some instances, also a US military presence. In addition to 
this came the expansion of NATO that brought the alliance even closer to Rus-
sia’s own borders. Taken together, these developments corresponded poorly to a 
closer relationship with the United States, which was seen as the main architect 
of these events. Even though the intentions on the US side were supposedly not 
intended to encircle, weaken or attempt to bring about regime change within 
Russia, the Russian political elite’s accumulated perceptions of these events 
made it difficult to argue otherwise. The use of what we can call Wilsonian ar-
guments on the US side did little to change these perceptions. In the worldview 
of important Russian decision-makers, such arguments only concealed the real 
US intentions aimed at securing American primacy by keeping Russia down. 
Whether primacists or transformationalists were in the driving seat of US for-
eign policy, whether the ingrained impulse to spread democratic values, work 
toward regime change or to integrate former Soviet states into Western institu-
tions, these policies were hardly conducive to an improved bilateral relationship 
with Russia. In some respects, it could be argued that the default Wilsonian 
settings of American foreign policy damaged the relationship with Russia more 
than any concerted effort to weaken or encircle it.
The strategic partnership in the war on terror and the prospects of an 
improved relationship created expectations of more understanding for Russian 
interests in the post-Soviet space. However, these expectations proved futile as 
long as the United States, instead of giving Russia a free hand in the area, was 
1��5 Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, “The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia Who They           
Are and What They Want”, Washington Quarterly, vol. 3�, no. 1 (����): 
9.
1���� Presidential administration deputy Vladislav Surkov stated this in an 
interview. Quoted from Viktor Yasmann, “Kremlin Articulates its Ideological 
Platform”, Russia Political Weekly, 13 October ���4 (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty [online 15 Jun ����]).
increasing its own presence. The sum of these policies and the domestic politi-
cal pressures they created in Russia signified the end of Russian pragmatism, 
and laid the foundations for a Russian policy to regain geopolitical control over 
its former sphere of influence in Eurasia. In turn, this policy created a reaction 
on the US side that escalated the level of criticism and increased suspicion of 
Russian motives. These developments, coupled with other negative events, con-
stituted a cumulative mass that created a structural downturn in the bilateral 
relationship. 
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ANALySIS AND CONCLUSION
The goal of this study has been to provide a systematic account of some im-
portant aspects of US foreign policy toward Russia in the period ���1–�����. 
As a backdrop to this, I have developed a set of political approaches based on 
different schools of thought concerning how to deal with Russia from a US 
foreign-policy perspective. To shed further light on the period in question, I 
have selected examples of prioritized issues on the Bush administration’s foreign 
policy agenda. Russia has been the primary policy object of some of these issues; 
others have been more general foreign-policy objectives. Having outlined the US 
policies in these selected areas, I have attempted to gather analyses of Russian 
perceptions of these policies. The purpose of merging these two approaches has 
been to try to ascertain how US policies toward Russia have worked out. In this 
final chapter, I aim to sum up some of the findings I have made, and to make 
some tentative conclusions about what effects US policy has had on the relation-
ship with Russia. 
Main findings 
Much due to the reduced influence of Russia, but also due to the expansion 
of the foreign-policy agenda because of other issues emerging and being given 
primary importance, the relationship between Russia and the United States has 
decreased in significance, particularly so for the United States. The relationship 
has also shown itself to be highly volatile and susceptible even to minor influ-
ences at various times during the early years of the new millennium. To some 
extent, this was of course a result of the uncertainties stemming from Russia 
adjusting to a dramatically changed domestic and international situation, but it 
was also an indication of a bilateral relationship that increasingly contained few 
issues of vital importance to the parties involved. Cooperation has been most 
successful on issues related to traditional security policy, many of which can 
be regarded as inherited from the US-Soviet relationship. Cooperation in areas 
such as arms control and non-proliferation, where Russia can still act with a 
semblance of parity with the US, have thus constituted the most solid ground 
in the relationship. These have also been the areas with the highest content of 
shared interests. 
The political will of the United States to involve Russia in other issues has 
varied. One of the main problems has been the huge costs linked to comprehen-
sive assistance programs to a country Russia’s size and the lack of domestic sup-
port in the US for launching such endeavors. Consequently, the United States has 
propagated the necessity for political and economic reforms, but without back-
ing up the rhetoric with the resources or political clout to facilitate the process. 
Thus US policy toward Russia in the area of political and economic reforms has 
mainly taken the form of criticism or rhetoric. 
In reality therefore, Russia has often been on the margins of issues on the 
US agenda, and rarely as the object of US foreign policy per se. In such cases, 
US and Russian interests have been in conflict, and neither the United States 
nor Russia have made conciliatory measures a rule of thumb. Both due to a 
heritage from their being Cold War antagonists, but also due to very different 
geopolitical, military, economic and political circumstances, there are not that 
many issues on which the United States and Russia have shared perspectives or 
a commonality of interests. The marginalization of Russia has led to policies 
that have prioritized other issues, countries and regions; this development has 
in turn had a detrimental effect on Russian national interests and the bilateral 
relationship. When this marginalization is coupled with official and rhetorical 
US policy toward Russia, there is a considerable disparity. At the height of posi-
tive developments in the relationship in ����, the Joint Declaration pointed 
toward a host of issues that could serve as a basis for a renewed and improved 
bilateral relationship. However, as the war on terror progressed, Russia fell out 
of the Bush administration’s focus, and the considerable potential of US-Russia 
relations fell short of its promise. 
Another important factor is the vastly asymmetrical relationship between 
the two countries, and the effects, primarily psychological, this has had on de-
velopments in the relationship. Russia’s political and economic decline ended 
sometime in ���5, and from this point on Russia again started defending its 
interests confidently. Since then, US authorities have had difficulties dealing with 
Russia being back in the game as an important actor; repeated claims of a more 
assertive Russian foreign policy serve as one indication of this development. In 
this regard, many policymakers and analysts in the US have confused the effects 
of regime type on the conduct of foreign policy. This confusion is primarily 
related to the relationship between a lack of democracy and the pursuit of Rus-
sian national interests. When the US and Russia have had conflicts of interest, 
these have been attributed to characteristics of Russia’s regime type, and not to 
national interests. Analyses such as these have brought about more criticism of 
a lack of democratic development, when in reality the crux of the matter is con-
flicting interests. The pursuit of national interests by Russia has therefore been 
made illegitimate by the United States, coupling it with idealist notions of a link 
between regime type and foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the lack of trust between the political elites of both countries 
has hampered positive developments. Both the United States and Russia claim 
from time to time that the other side is still waging the Cold War, and this is to 
some extent true. It is most clearly discernible with regard to NATO expansion, 
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but also very much alive in the assessments coming from Washington DC of de-
velopments in Russia. Russia’s basic distrust of US intentions has also impeded 
the development of “normalized” economic relations, especially in the energy 
sector. The sector’s strategic importance and the desire to limit foreign access to 
it have been reasons for the difficulty. When the US-Russian agenda was cleared 
of issues related to strategic arms, there were few signs of anything resembling a 
special relationship or a strategic partnership. Discussions between Russian for-
eign-policy analysts about whether Russia had been treated by the US in a way 
that resembled the concessions they felt Russia had given started surfacing as 
early as the summer of ����, little more than half a year after President Putin’s 
9/11 telephone call to President Bush. From the Russian perspective, what was 
seen as Russian concessions led to expectations of some kind of payback from 
the US, especially on trade issues. The most important aspects here were WTO 
membership and the abolition of the Jackson-Vanik Act. Despite the Bush ad-
ministration’s repeated promises on both these issues, the US did nothing to 
facilitate Russia’s entry into the global trade system. Although WTO accession 
involved complex negotiations which deepended on other actors as well, lifting 
Jackson-Vanik would have been relatively easy for the Bush administration if it 
had been willing to spend the necessary political capital. These two issues came 
to signify the case of the “missing payback” from the United States and clearly 
showed that the US could not be counted on to deliver on its promises. Russia 
had evidently hoped for a new level of bilateral cooperation that would offer 
financial, military, and geopolitical dividends. Instead, Russia saw a US admin-
istration determined to pursue its own interests on all fronts, improving its own 
economic and military advantages at every opportunity. The Kremlin’s irritation 
at this trend in American policies has had a detrimental influence on all facets 
of the relationship. 
For Russia, esteem and a semblance of equality are the most important 
desirable things the US can give. Any kind of parity with the US and the ac-
ceptance of a special role for Russia have always been a key legitimizing do-
mestic political factor in Moscow.1��� Therefore, whenever the US has chosen to 
support independence and democracy in the post-Soviet area, this choice has 
also involved prioritizing cultivating relationships with other countries to the 
detriment of its relationship with Russia. This argument goes to the core of the 
way Russia perceived its “special role” in the area, and the understanding it 
thought it had with the US on this. An end to the long-standing “Russia first” 
principle of American policy toward the states of the former Soviet Union was 
also implied. Overall, this led to a situation in which the US seemed to challenge 
1��� Aron, “The United States and Russia”: 5.
Russian policymakers on what was arguably the most important issue on Putin’s 
foreign-policy agenda. 
Dominant approaches 
At various points in chapter 3, I argued that the most central issues in the first 
period of the Bush administration were dominated by a primacist line of policy. 
In this period, the administration steered clear largely of including domestic 
politics and developments on its agenda with Russia. After making democratiza-
tion and regime change an integral part of the global war on terror, it became 
increasingly difficult to keep domestic issues off the agenda in the relationship 
with Russia. This was made even more difficult as the domestic situation in 
Russia grew more problematic as Russia continued to deviate from the path of 
democratic development. As a reaction to this, US criticism of political develop-
ments in Russia gradually increased. Early in the second term of the Bush ad-
ministration, this eventually shifted the policy over toward a transformationalist 
policy, and an increased focus on democratic development was argued for. These 
assessments do not imply that US policy was made solely along the lines of these 
schools of thought, but it implies a preponderant policy direction. How does 
this play out in relation to the preferences of the Russian leadership? 
Returning to the discussion in chapter 4, I argued that a majority of the 
Russian elite preferred Republican presidents to Democratic ones. The main 
reason for this was the relative predictability of dealing with Republicans; they 
tended to have a pragmatic foreign-policy orientation, but also sought out possi-
bilities to gain the upper hand if possible, thereby also implying a more primacist 
direction. Democratic administrations, on the other hand, tended to focus more 
on domestic issues and the promotion of democracy and human rights. In the 
Russian point of view, the Bush administration seemed to possess negative traits 
from both political camps. The US working along primacist lines in the security-
policy sphere with a largely unilateralist stance on negotiations and an increas-
ingly interventionist policy in Russia’s near abroad was not what Moscow had 
hoped for from the Bush administration. Later, when this was combined with 
a solid focus on the need for democratic regime change in the near abroad and 
in Russia itself, it should hardly surprise the US that these lines of policy would 
adversely affect developing closer cooperation on other issues with Russia. This 
fact also aggravated Russian suspicions about the pretext for this type of criti-
cism of internal Russian affairs. Russians would usually expect Democrats to 
use these types of arguments; Republicans using them, however, concerned the 
Russians; it was felt that the Republicans were using them to influence interna-
tional opinion on Russia. 
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It can also be argued that the meager traditions for idealist foreign policy in 
Russia make it less inclined to believe in the honesty of such policies. This would 
again refer to what I have discussed earlier and called the Wilsonian dilemma. 
This analytical dilemma, in addition to few examples of Russia employing ideal-
ist policies, could point in the direction that Russia is more comfortable with 
actors working from a pragmatist or primacist perspective. This is also linked 
to the earlier analysis of Russia preferring Republicans to Democrats, so there 
are reasons to believe that Russia has a clearer understanding of pragmatist and 
primacist policies than the transformationalist line of policy. The integrationist 
line of policy would probably be preferable to Russia, but hardly a likely course 
of action given the degree of concessions this would imply for the US. 
The Wilsonian dilemma
In my opinion, the focus on democratization and regime transformation issues 
have tended to undermine other initiatives taken in the foreign-policy sphere 
between Russia and the United States. This has to do with the analytical di-
lemma associated with idealist policies. The actor on the receiving end of ideal-
ist policies can never be certain whether Wilsonian policies are being pursued 
because of underlying idealist intentions or whether they are in fact policies 
motivated by primacism. This obviously concerns the general problem of trust 
in bilateral relations between states. In addition to this, the United States has not 
conducted a consistent policy of democratization and regime change. From the 
Russian perspective, a number of countries with problematic track records on 
democracy and human rights have experienced considerably less public criticism 
than Russia. A Freedom Agenda that only applies selective democratization is 
therefore likely to further exacerbate the Wilsonian dilemma. This policy dem-
onstrates that US idealism is variable, and that the use of transformationalism is 
selective, and it also points toward the fact that concrete security or economic 
interests are often more important than values.
Conducting idealist and realist policies simultaneously creates the danger 
that even issues clearly based on mutual interests that could have provided fertile 
ground for cooperation become influenced by the distrust and suspicion caused 
by Wilsonian policies; other areas of cooperation that could have been easier to 
pursue, given higher levels of trust, could thus be undermined. The mechanism 
indicated here could also undermine the foundation of mutually beneficial co-
operation in the longer term because it creates uncertainty regarding the basic 
directions of the counterpart’s foreign policies. This does not imply that idealist 
goals should not be pursued, but that they are inherently more complex to con-
duct, especially in relationships without a solid track record based on mutual 
interests and trust, thus making a somewhat more strengthened case for pursu-
ing a clear and interest-based policy focusing on security and economic issues. 
The critique of a transformationalist policy toward Russia is two-pronged: first, 
there is the Wilsonian dilemma itself; second, there are huge economic and politi-
cal costs linked to engaging in a transformationalist policy beyond the rhetorical 
level. This is linked to the complexities and difficulties of regime transformation 
in foreign countries, and to the problem of dealing with domestic lobbies that 
pull in opposite directions at the same time. On one side, there is the Wilso-
nian school of thought, arguing for the necessity for democratization; on the 
other, there are the Jacksonians and Jeffersonians not wishing to engage in such 
projects, and working to limit the funding for and timetable of the Wilsonian 
efforts, thereby undermining the feasibility of pursuing this line of policy in the 
first place. This mechanism and the influence of the other schools of thought on 
the pursuit of Wilsonian politics create a problem of credibility in the long-run. 
This point is of a general kind, but it had specific effects on the relationship with 
Russia. The lack of long-term commitment with regard to the transformation 
of the country had a great impact during the 199�s. Even though there was US 
support for reforms in Russia, there was no will to see the process through and 
no resources – financial or political – to back it up. The United States seems to 
have trouble clearly seeing the long-term consequences of its own policies in this 
regard, and the implications this had for building trust. 
Developments toward 2009 
For the US and Russia to be able to continue to have a bilateral relationship that 
constitutes a central facet of international affairs in the post-Cold War world, 
the basic premises would probably have to be reworked. This seems unlikely in 
the foreseeable future, with presidential campaigns and elections coming up in 
both countries. Most analysts therefore predict a bilateral turn for the worse 
before the relationship has any chance of improving again. The rhetoric in both 
countries’ presidential elections could easily increase tensions and strain rela-
tions even more. 
It is discouraging to realize that the relationship does not seem to be mov-
ing forwards or backwards, but rather in cyclical fluctuations, which on the 
surface seem connected to the presidential election cycles; this demonstrates that 
the bilateral relationship between the USA and Russia is shallow and fragile, 
with little real substance or solidity. US-Russian relations have always been a 
government-to-government relationship without the mutual trade and economic 
dependencies characterizing and solidifying Russian relations with Europe. This 
has made the overall relationship volatile. In this regard, it is fair to say that the 
rapprochement after 9/11 and the alliance in the war on terror represented the 
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exception to and not the rule in US-Russia relations. When looking at the rela-
tionship over a longer time span, this becomes increasingly clear. 
Partnership with Russia would be difficult to establish and maintain if the 
US continues to pursue policies that do not take Russian interests into account. 
Trying to pursue a policy of selective cooperation that reaps the benefits of part-
nership in some cases, while working against vital Russian national interests 
in others, will simply not work for the United States. As I pointed out earlier, 
the expansion of NATO resembled from a Russian perspective an encirclement 
strategy designed for containment. In the future, this could become a source of 
serious friction between the United States and Russia, especially if the US contin-
ues to engage persistently in Russia’s top geopolitical priority – the near abroad. 
This perceived containment was hard to combine with efforts to increase coop-
eration, especially when any talk from the Bush administration of a strategic 
partnership with Russia was very far from the political reality. The strategic 
partnership mentioned so often in ���1–���� lacked both content and inten-
tions from the US side, and this was definitely a lower priority than many other 
issues on the US foreign-policy agenda. The administration’s decisions about is-
sues regarding the relationship with Russia also reflect this. Time and again the 
Bush administration demonstrated a lack of will to take decisions that involved 
any kind of political price to enhance cooperation with Russia. 
Therefore, it seems that US Russia policy is driven more by politics than by 
foreign-policy strategy; a strain of containment has thus been an easier political 
option than working toward more cooperation. Under the next administration, 
this will probably have to change if the relationship is not to deteriorate any 
further. Whether this a feasible policy and whether it can garner any kind of 
political attention and support is a different matter. 
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